THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume XIV MAY, 1950 Number 4

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The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscriptions: $4.00 a year (foreign, $4.30); single copies $1.00 (foreign, $1.10). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals,* New York City.

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AN INTERPRETATION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN MENTALITY

ENDRE IVANKA

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THE LINE WHICH SEPARATES Central and Eastern Europe is cultural and religious rather than geographical, and marks the boundary between the Western (Roman Catholic and Protestant) and the Eastern (Orthodox) spheres of influence. In the latter, all of those forces which have determined the structure of the cultural life of Western Europe have undergone far-reaching changes or have assumed a totally different relationship to one another, even where the nations have striven to acclimate the cultural achievements of the West. In the individual, westernization has succeeded fairly well, but, in the mass, the Eastern influences have dominated; thus the western bureaucratic state and enlightened absolutism developed into the Tsarist autocracy; the economic system of communism turned into an atheistic doctrine confessed with religious fervor; the liberal or romantic nationalism of the West became an awareness of the selected nature of a "people of God," and the idealistic and constructive philosophy of the West (Schelling and Hegel) became agnosticism operating with religious motives (Solovyev, Bulgakov).

These examples show clearly that religiosity, or, rather, a definite attitude toward it, has had a decisive and fundamental influence upon the mentality of Eastern Europe. A study of this attitude and its effects is the only safe way of determining the origin of the Eastern European mentality, for Slavic tradition and the "Slavic soul" do not furnish a satisfactory explanation, since we can find the roots of the present attitude in Byzantium at a time when Slavic influence was practically non-existent. In the case of Russia, it is now emphasized that the Rus of Kiev, before the Tartar invasions, was still on the borderline between East and West, and that its relations with the Latin-Scandinavian West were as strong as those with the Byzantine East. This shows, again, that it was the cultural orientation that made Russia the most typical example of the Eastern mentality.

Yet, on both sides of the line, there is the same Christianity with the same creed. The Schism was a symptom rather than a cause of the

separation, which began even while the East and West were living together in relative harmony. Yet there took shape at that time a different attitude towards mysticism and its role in the intellectual and religious life, and it was this difference that determined the course of cultural development. This article is an attempt to explain the Eastern mentality, therefore, through its mystical aspect.

I

THE SPIRITUAL BASIS

MYSTICAL AND NON-MYSTICAL IDEAL OF FAITH

Regardless of the similarity of teaching and dogma, of sacrament and cult, the attitude toward mysticism differs in various religious groups. Even though the religion itself remains unchanged, its manifestations will be different according to whether we look upon mysticism largely as a psychological phenomenon which is, from the religious standpoint, an unusual gift of grace that testifies to the truth of its religious content, or if we consider mystical experience as the definite climax of religious experience, the necessary link between faith and eternal bliss.

In the first case, faith becomes primarily a matter of will, inspired by grace. Since it is impossible to investigate all the dogmas of religion, the intellect, in accepting them, performs an act of obedience, and the will, motivated by grace, leads us on. There is no continuity between natural knowledge and that knowledge which we are promised by eternal bliss. The emphasis is laid upon the will, and the intellect acts only in the rational sphere. It is no road, no preparatory stage, to vision of the light of grace. Mystical experience brings us closer to eternal bliss, but it is not a necessary step towards it.

The second interpretation, which places faith in the realm of mystical experience, considers the act of faith as an inspiration in itself. The act of faith is not only meritorious because it constitutes an act of intellectual obedience, but because it adds to knowledge; it elevates the intellect above itself and into the sphere of the divine. Thus faith becomes the first step in the deification of the human spirit. The road to eternal bliss, to the immediate vision of the divine, leads over the mystical experience. Thus the mystical is not only a miraculous proof of the divine, but is the normal revelation of the divine in the sphere of religious knowledge, and each aspect of religion—prayer, sacra-

mental piety, liturgy, art—leads into mysticism. From this standpoint, there is an absolute continuity between the contents of knowledge—already contained in the first manifestation of love for God—the light of faith, the mystical vision, and the vision of God in eternal bliss. Each step is, in its own lesser degree, a refraction of the one light which shines in all its purity only at the summit.

It goes without saying that the philosophical basis of the first point of view is Aristotelian; the second, Platonic. The first, which is predominantly Western, only came into being after the acceptance of Aristotle in the twelfth century. The Augustinianism of the earlier Middle Ages, as well as the philosophy of St. Augustine himself, was essentially Platonic, and has survived in the second point of view, which is that of the East and the Orthodox. Aristotelian philosophy emphasizes the strictly rational intellectual processes and permits no other power to influence the shaping of knowledge. It leads to a decisive separation between the mystical and the "light of natural knowledge" as well as of faith. The latter becomes a matter of the will of obedience to mercy and to the *motivum credibilitatis.* Mystical knowledge is not an elevation of rational knowledge or a transition to knowledge through grace. It may confirm and shed light upon rational knowledge, but it is not a further step in its development.

The second interpretation, Platonism, which we may call the mystical Eastern point of view, accepts an all-embracing and immediate, uniform idea of the entire wholeness and perfect essence of the Absolute. The approach to that comprehension is not only the logically developing generalization of the comprehensible, but the search of Eros for that perfect Allness which extends beyond the visible and finite. Ecstasy is not, therefore, in contrast to thinking and knowing, but their realization and fulfillment. A theology based upon it acknowledges, in the Platonic Eros, love as a yearning for the divine and also the beginning of knowledge of it. It makes mysticism a road to knowledge of the higher, divine sphere, and treats each force that elevates man as a step toward the realization of the One. The almost forgotten writings of Gregory of Nyssa and of Maximus the Confessor show how Platonism is linked to Christian mysticism in this mystically oriented theology. For, just as Plato recognizes no positive values which do not stem from the world of ideas and, thus, in the last analysis, from the idea of the Good, the One, so this Platonic-mystical theology does not

differentiate between the natural and supernatural spheres. It considers all that is good in the former as a function of the latter, and comprehends its natural essence only through its orientation toward the supernatural. In the same way, it regards the natural as merely the lowest step in the development of supernatural knowledge and places both within the general development of mysticism.

This second attitude toward mysticism leads inevitably to a denial and a renunciation of individuality and the intrinsic value of the natural sphere, for the natural is considered only in its relation to the supernatural, and as somehow oriented to it. Nature in itself does not exist. There is only nature which is already, in its very essence, determined by the divine, and nature penetrated by anti-divine forces, i.e., "supernatural" and "essentially evil" nature. There is no purely "Natural" nature, just in the same way as Origen, in a formula frequently condemned as heretical, regards "being human" as having only the choice between being angel or devil. This interpretation, naturally, does not look with any humanistic interest upon that intellectual and ethical endeavor of a self-dependent nature which is inherent in Aristotelianism, and which was pointed out by Roger Bacon when he advised Christians to read Seneca, for, "Nothing will more irresistibly urge us to live ethically as we, who are born and raised in grace, should, than to see what heights a man could reach without the aid of grace."

Platonism, on the contrary, cannot accept this concept. It will never attribute to nature what it conceives of as coming from the mystical-divine sphere. Each step toward that divine is not a perfection and elevation of the natural, but a transmutation of the essence and complete conquest of what, in principal, is anti-divine and worldly.

COSMIC RELIGION AND HUMAN-PERSONAL RELIGION

Under this system, man's orientation towards God in faith becomes a cosmic principle. The personification of God, the alliance of the highest spiritual force (the one divine person) with the living and the material (the lowest cosmic sphere) becomes the cornerstone of cosmic unity, just as the union of the spiritual soul and the formless chaotic body, according to Gregory of Nyssa, took place only in order that one mercy should penetrate the entire visible and invisible universe. Similarly, the resurrection of one of its components, God-bearing mankind,

allied with Christ and elevated to God, penetrates the universe, just as the sensory perception of one organ, because of the coherence of nature, penetrates the entire living body. This grace, in sacramental consecration, results in a transfiguration of the elements themselves, and the elemental becomes part of the religious liturgy. The Eastern consecration of the baptismal font, which is also a consecration of all flowing waters, clearly expresses this cosmic feeling, so that we can speak of a cosmic pan-liturgism. Each cosmic reality is put into the religious frame—for or against God, an obstacle to be fought or a means of ascent to God. Religious consciousness becomes the one great general idea of the cosmos, viewed and understood through its all-embracing relation to God. As a corollary of all this, the Platonic-mystical approach assumes that the supernatural reveals itself with a certain regularity in visible form, not as an extraordinary manifestation of a miracle through the universal power of God: thus, the bodies of the saints do not decay; mystical vision becomes a visible light, supernatural yet concrete; etc. Miracles are not regarded as unique and isolated phenomena, but result from the principle that the spirit which lives in the believer, in the mystic, can also be effective in the outer world, that "the spirit can reshape the faith of the world."

In contrast, the Aristotelian interpretation, at least in principle, considers the realms of nature and of reason as separate and independent of religion. Nature is not expected to give testimony of the supernatural, except where a miracle intrudes upon it as something different, fundamentally alien, which, by its very different characteristics, testifies to the existence of something different and higher. Nature can only give proof of its maker, of the "Dieu des philosophes," not of the "Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac, de Jacob" (Pascal).

We can, in this connection, with real justice, contrast the world of the monastery and the world of the university. The Platonic philosophy culminated in the monastic organization of Mount Athos, devoted to meditation and the practice of the monastic virtues. The other tradition produced the great medieval universities of the West, which endeavored to take into account all science, all natural values and all reasonable knowledge, and to show that these, when properly developed, did not contradict the truth of religion, even though they did not receive their total importance or value to humanity from it—a typical humanistic approach.

CHURCH OF THE SPIRIT AND CHURCH OF DOGMA

The Platonic-mystical interpretation of faith affects the essence of the Church. If love, the striving towards the divine and the earthly knowledge of it, is the principle of the knowledge of faith; if faith is the inner mystic light; if the faithful finally are guided and taught by the teachings of God, then the Church is not so much the guardian or medium of the teachings of faith, as it is the community of those who carry in themselves the divine spirit, the light of faith. Despite the fact that it stresses the idea of the *corpus mysticum,* it can easily lead to the belief that a teaching church is unnecessary and no more than a society of disciples of God. (The text, John 6:54, is often quoted by "spiritual sects" to support their ideas concerning the Church.) It tends towards messianism, for it attempts to transfer the final state of eternal salvation into the present world, for the select few who anticipate their eternal experience and receive the teachings of God immediately through mystical visions.

Modern research has shown the extent to which the shaping of the modern individual since the Renaissance has been influenced by a "secularization" of this idea of the "spiritual church." In this new form, the highest authority, self-determination, and self-glorification is granted every human being solely on the strength of his natural, human, free personality—the same perquisites which, according to the "spiritual church," can be enjoyed only by the bearer of the spirit, the mystic, who receives revelations from, and is motivated directly by, the spirit of God, and who, for that reason, does not receive guidance from any external authority, but finds ultimate truth and the ultimate law for his actions in himself. Consequently, the idea of the Church as a teacher of the truth of faith which is to be obediently accepted, and of ethics which are to be followed, can no longer be maintained. Origen, as a true follower of Plato, identified the ultimate spiritual understanding with mystical experience, and taught that the *pneumaticos*—who, as a result of the teachings of the Church, does not only accept the truth of faith, but penetrates it spiritually and experiences it mystically—is no longer subject to those teachings, for he has himself the highest authority by virtue of the spirit he contains. This idea has a messianic character, inasmuch as it transfers—at least as regards that select group—the final state proclaimed by religion into the visible world. This is implied in the medieval saying which early changed

from a dangerous spiritual formula to a mere pious comparison, that monks "vitam angelicam ducunt, non humanam."

II

THE HISTORICAL BASIS

This contrast between Eastern and Western mentality did not exist in the beginning, or if it did, it was not a matter of Aristotelian versus Platonic thinking. The Western world of the twelfth century still shows the struggle between the extreme Aristotelianism of Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée and the mystically-oriented thinking of St. Bernard and the Victorines. But it would be overbold to consider one of these philosophies more "Western" than the other. The synthesis of the two attitudes occurs in the thirteenth century, when a purely rational philosophy and Greek-Arabic science join hands with a theology which is still essentially Augustinian; the natural and the supernatural, reason and faith, enter into that relationship which has already been characterized as the Aristotelian version of the relations of religion and theology. Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas says[1] that the Platonic basis of the problem is the correct one from the standpoint of life in the hereafter, but, as far as real, present life, the *status vitae,* is concerned, the Aristotelian approach is right. He goes on to say[2] that, as a theologian, he speaks of a world oriented towards God which is an image of the divine, while as a philosopher he treats the world as creation, as it is, and with no regard for its relation to God or its potential destiny. Intellectually speaking, the "Occident" originated with this synthesis that resulted in High Scholasticism, out of which developed the strictly rational and humanistic renaissance of the intellectual world of Antiquity, Humanism, and the European evaluation of the personality. This resulted in the final separation of the East and West. The tension between Orient and Occident stemmed from the Eastern refusal to recognize the values which formed the basis of the cultural life of Europe.

No matter how strongly individual elements of the culture of ancient Greece made themselves felt in the culture of Byzantium; no matter to what extent we can talk of a Byzantine Renaissance during the eleventh

1. *Quaestio de veritate* 19, 1. 1.
2. *Contra Gentes,* II.

and twelfth centuries (in the strictly formal literal sense), the East never accepted the philosophy and the intellectual way of life of Antiquity as an antithesis to its own Christian tradition, or recognized as a problem the synthesis of rationalist philosophy and the Christian faith. Whatever the East borrowed from Antiquity (late Platonism and Neo-Platonism) was given Christian form or unconsciously accepted as a Christian phenomenon, so that it could never be taken as alien or un-Christian. Basil the Great, in his discussion of pagan literature, raises the question whether Christians should attach any value to the formal, artistic, and rhetorical education Antiquity offered. Speaking of the exemplary virtues expressed in the classic literatures and arts, he asks whether they are exemplary for Christians, but he shows no appreciation of the fact that the entire Christian theology of his time was based on classic Greek thinking, on the philosophy of Plato. This attitude is universal in the religious history of Byzantium. All were so completely immersed in Platonic thinking that they did not even notice it. While supposedly fighting the paganism of Antiquity, they fought only definite later manifestations of Neo-Platonism (as in Julian, Iamblichos, and Proklos), which had aided in a renaissance of paganism from the fifth century to Nicholas of Methone in the eleventh century. Aristotelianism, that form of classic philosophy with which the West satiated itself, was not accepted, the more so since it became the basis of the theology of the despised "Latinists." The Schism magnified a difference between East and West which had nothing to do with the ecclesiastical separation as such.

The more conscious the West became of its important task of assimilating the entire classic literature, philosophy, and science into its great spiritual synthesis, the more firmly did the East refuse to accept anything that might have looked like a new idea, like a concession to the Aristotelianism of the Latinists. Even where people continued to live and think in those traditions of Plato which had been Christianized in the fourth and fifth centuries, they pretended to continue the old and pure Christian traditions of the Fathers, and fought the Aristotelians, whom they called "fellow-travellers of the Latinists," "disciples of pagan philosophers," "admirers of pure reason," "Sophists and Syllogists." They accused these of holding the artificialities of logic more sacred than the Bible and the sayings of the Fathers. Thus Platonic-mystical thinking gained control of the East.

But, as late as the fourteenth century, a group of leading Byzantine

scholars and thinkers (Nikephoros Gregoras, Gregorios Akyndynos, Prochoros, and Demetrios Kydones), friends of the Latinists, sided with the Aristotelians in a quarrel over a question of mysticism which was very typical of the Eastern way of thinking, and, even after them, there was no lack of defenders of Aristotelian-humanistic thinking, who, significantly, were simultaneously friends and sponsors of the reunion of the Church. Only when this group lost out to the one-sided, mystically oriented, and tradition-minded monks of Athos, when the hopes for Church Union collapsed before the conquest of Constantinople and the Aristotelian way of thinking became discredited, was the further development of Eastern spiritual history unequivocally determined. With the establishment of Ottoman rule after the fall of Constantinople, all secular cultural traditions were abandoned, and the hagiaritic monastic republic on Mount Athos became the ruling force in matters spiritual.

This was decisive for the East; although the patriarchal see of Constantinople remained the clerical center of Orthodoxy, its spiritual center was the Mount, and this determined the spiritual aspect of Orthodoxy. Thus, the mystic-Platonic tendency became the philosophy of the East *kat exochen;* the monkish-dualistic attitude became typical of the East, and since no other cultural tradition still existed and all traditions of secular culture had been extinguished, the problem of the synthesis of Christian tradition and the spiritual heritage of Antiquity, Greek philosophy, rationally and humanistically interpreted, was not even raised. Nor was there any need for contact with a purely humane, naturally determined education. Whatever was not part and parcel of the mystic-Platonic attitude was "pagan" and unacceptable. "Pagan" and "Latin" were often used as synonyms. Thus, the peculiar Eastern Orthodox state of mind developed. The Schism, the organization of the Eastern Church as the Church of the Byzantine Empire and the later creation of the Russian Imperial Church, occurred, to be sure, under pressure from the state. But the framework received its spiritual content from Mount Athos.

THE MENTALITY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH

This basic, Platonic-mystical principle explains the mentality of the Eastern Church as it developed historically: a fundamental irrationalism, a dualistic view of life, anti-humanism and anti-rationalism, the anti-cultural attitude, the mystical mood, the cosmic orientation

of religious feeling, and, finally, the "monkish" state of mind. This is due, not so much to the fact that those Fathers who represent patriotic tradition in the East (the Cappadocians, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, etc.) accepted Platonism as the only possible philosophical basis. The Eastern monks, who, between the eleventh and the thirteenth century, assumed more and more spiritual leadership, fought philosophy on principle, even though their own thinking followed a Platonic pattern. With the fifteenth century, independent philosophical activity in the East ended altogether.

In the higher scientific theology (in seventeenth-century Greece and in Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) Westernizing influences can be found. Western handbooks were frequently accepted without revision, or only superficially adjusted to Orthodox feelings. Later, authentic Eastern traditions were consciously revived in order to check these Westernizing forces.

Thus, it was not the continued philosophical tradition which was decisive, but that mentality which had been made an integral part of the national consciousness of the Orthodox countries by the anti-philosophic monks. This was no new tendency in the East. Gregory of Nazianzen, the master of Greek dialectic and classic rhetoric, stated that he wanted to think *halieutikos, ouk aristotelikos,* like a fisherman (St. Peter), not like a philosopher (Aristotle). St. Jerome, too, describes a vision in which he was told: *Ciceronianus est non Christianus,* and repents; yet he was one of the greatest literary stylists, a savant, and the patron saint of Christian humanism.

From the fourteenth century on, such statements were intended quite seriously. About 1600, the Ukrainian Athos monk, Ivan Vyshensky, addressed his co-religionists who permitted themselves to be goaded into studying the pagan Plato and Aristotle in the Latin academies of Poland thus:

> Orthodox Russian Christians, simple, humble, and ignorant, remain faithful to the simplicity of the gospel which promises you eternal life and do not be misled by these pagan sages, like whom you might be called wise in this life when you study their words, but with whom you will burn in hell afterwards. God's spirit enters not into those who boast of worldly sophistication, but will choose him who remains in simple ignorance.[3]

3. A. Florovsky, "Le conflit de deux traditions—la latine et la byzantine—dans la vie intellectuelle de l'Europe Orientale aux 16ème-17ème siècles." Bulletin No. 31 of the Free Russian University (Prague, 1937), pp. 177 f. This article also contains a

Florovsky points out that such statements are not the protests of ignorant people against higher education. They are manifestations of a principle. The Slavophile Leontyev, in the second half of the nineteenth century, regarded the "healthy barbarism" of the Russians as a bulwark against the pernicious effects of Western liberalism and a guarantee of the continued existence of the Orthodox way of life. Formulating a *communis opinio,* rather than expressing his personal opinion, Dostoyevsky, who was no enemy of culture, stated: "The Russian people live entirely in the Faith and in its ideology. They have nothing else and need nothing else, for the Faith is everything."

The cultural mission of Orthodoxy, therefore, does not include the linking of secular education, of the purely rational, with religion, or the assimilation of the former to the latter. Even the special philosophical school which originated with the conscious renaissance of traditional Orthodox thinking (as interpreted by Bulgakov, Florensky, and Arseniev) emphasizes the belief that only religiously oriented thinking, imbued with the "spirit," can lead to a deeper understanding of the universe and of the connection between the religious way of life, with its orientation towards the Beyond, on one hand, and the visible world on the other, and that purely rational thinking is incapable of accepting a higher truth or of giving true knowledge. Here, again, mysticism and the mystically interpreted act of faith become a principle of knowledge; the existence of a self-contained, natural-rational sphere is denied. This belief found the strangest expressions: in 1849, a professor of the University of Kazan was tried in court because he taught that the law is based on common sense and not on the Gospel.[4]

This basic irrationalism, the belief that religion, and even ethics, are based entirely on the mystically interpreted experience of faith explains all other characteristics of this mentality, as well as its limited resistance to rationalism. Thus, the Russian Church cannot bring itself to fight by means of rational proof and rebuttal, and cannot stand up under an attack of logical argument, once the challenge to participate in rational debate is accepted. For the same reason, that Church

collection of other statements of the same nature, e.g., that of the highly erudite Prince Kurbsky, of the sixteenth century, and of the Old Believers (Raskolniki), of the late seventeenth century.

4. T. G. Masaryk, *Zur russischen Geschichts—und Religions-philosophie,* I (Jena, 1913), 95.

has always been vulnerable to the undermining effects of sectarianism; religion based on a mystic-pneumatic interpretation has difficulty in attacking the principle of subjective inspiration through which sects come into being. The dualism and anti-humanism of the Russian Church are manifestations of the same trend. If there is no truth other than revealed truth, no true knowledge other than inner inspiration through faith, it becomes impossible to meet the outsider and unbeliever on the basis of a common nature and of pure reason; then the reinforcement of the structure of faith through the means of natural knowledge and the display of interest in the cultural values of a world not determined by faith—an interest based on respect for the merely natural-reasonable phenomena—makes no sense. Human nature itself becomes dubious as soon as it is no longer determined by faith and transfigured by grace. Dostoyevsky's works testify to this incurable lack of trust in human nature. Natural forces, unless transfigured and elevated, are evil per se. There is nothing between the Angel and Satan, except, at best, the animal, as can be clearly seen in the three basic types which Dostoyevsky uses over and over, represented by Alyosha, Ivan, and Dimitri Karamazov.

The East does not intend to reshape the world according to the principles of faith nor to create a higher order based on natural values; it wants to fight the world and to escape from it. That is the primary reason for the passive mood of Eastern piety, a mood which can also be explained by the long submission of the Orthodox peoples to the rule of Tartars and Ottomans, who did not permit them to participate in the development of the world around them and left them powerless to shape their own lives. But the passive mood had existed already in Byzantium and became a particularly bad influence on Russia. Solovyev considered it the worst shortcoming of Russian Orthodoxy. It is the natural result of a piety based entirely on the dualistic philosophy of the oriental monks.

In the occidental world, on the other hand, the monks themselves became the instruments of an active reorganization of the world through faith, which began with the cultivation of barbaric countries (as, for instance, by the Cistercians) and went as far as complete mastery of secular pagan science, which was brought into harmony with the basic principles of faith by the Dominicans. The positive aspect of the dualistic escape from the world is the immersion in mystical

experience which means so much more in the East than in the West, since it represents nothing extraordinary and marvelous, but is a necessary element of a cosmos penetrated by religion. This element is just as much part of the cosmos as the merely natural, and it must reveal itself with the same continuity of natural law in its sphere as do the natural realities in theirs. Personal, ethical saintliness is, for that reason, revealed to the outer world through the indestructibility of the dead saint's bodily remains. The death of the Starets Zosima, in *The Brothers Karamazov,* makes this clear, and Holbein's picture of the dead Christ, in *The Idiot,* represents, for the same reason, a denial of faith. At one stage of the sanctification, of the immersion, the divine light that emanates from God must, therefore—according to Hesychastic teachings—become visible to the mystic; it is for this reason that—as the landowner Motovilov reports—the Starets Seraphim of Optino is suddenly bathed in a visible light as proof of his saintliness; and for that reason, also, the domes of the churches of Russia light up and "renew" themselves.[5]

We must not forget that the religious art of the East aims not merely to depict stories of the saints, ethical examples, or the contents of faith, but, rather, endeavors to render the divine visible—as is evidenced by the gold background which represents unearthly glow, and by the hieratic stylization of the figures. Western man takes it for granted that inner saintliness, ethical values, and religious experience have no outward manifestations. The Easterner's faith, however—as examples from Dostoyevsky prove—would be jeopardized by the absence of outward cosmic proof of ethical values. To him, faith is not only a state of mind necessary for the achievement of salvation in the hereafter; as far as its form is concerned, this state of mind, although supernaturally motivated by grace, is no more than the voluntary acceptance of revealed truth translated into human ideas, i.e., divine contents interpreted through human knowledge. St. Thomas Aquinas emphasizes that, in faith, *cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis.*[6] In the East, faith is a higher form of mystical knowledge which permits observance and immediate acceptance of the divine on earth and in this life.

5. See N. Arseniev, *Die Kirche des Morgenlandes—Weltanschauung und Frömmigkeitsleben* (Berlin, 1926), p. 73.

6. *Sum. Theol.,* II-II. 1. 2.

This is very clearly expressed in the popular beliefs of the Russians, in legends and superstitions, as in the tale of the Church at Kitezh. The story, as it was told as recently as the early twentieth century in the Novgorod region, relates that this church was the first ever to have been built in Russia and was, therefore, the holiest of all Russian churches. When the Tartars invaded the country and spread devastation everywhere, in order to save the church from destruction, God rendered it invisible. Once a year, on Midsummer Night, it becomes visible, but only to those who hold with the old Russian faith as it was proclaimed by Prince Vladimir, the builder of the edifice. Students of Russian folklore have witnessed the annual pilgrimage which brought members of all sects from every part of Russia together on the hills surrounding the "Bright Lake," into which the city of Kitezh is supposed to have sunk. On the hills, then, in the invisible-visible church—visible only to the pilgrims and to no one else—services were held which lasted through the night, and the members of one sect would tease those who belonged to others, who thought that they, too, were in a church, while it was obvious to the initiated that they were standing on a barren hill with no roof but the sky over their heads! Each sect took it for granted that the invisible would be revealed exclusively to its own members because of their "true" faith.

"Holy Russia," with the holy city of Moscow as its center, was, in a cosmic sense, just as much the "Holy Empire" as was Byzantium for its people, with the world's holiest church, the Hagia Sophia, as its center, inside the walls of which the last patriarch of free Constantinople is said to have miraculously vanished when the city fell to the Turks—the church from which, dressed in the same vestments he wore then, and carrying in his hands the same chalice, he will reappear, once the city is restored to the rightful emperor of the right faith. Russian tradition has it that the city of Jerusalem will be in Russian hands and will be the sun which, rising in the East, will send its fiery rays over all Russian soil; and in that city there will be the apostolic Church of Holy Sophia, with its seventy golden domes, the holiest of the holy.[7]

The most typical, and to some extent official, expression of this attitude, is found in the Hesychasts, the mysticism of the Athos monks, and the philosophy of Palamitism. This particular philosophy contains

7. *Altrussische Heiligenlegenden* (Munich, 1922), p. 93.

all the traits that have been mentioned: The mystic claim that vision of the divine light can be achieved through submersion and a certain manner of prayer—a vision of an "energy" of God, which, though different from the essence of God, is essentially divine, the denial of which, according to the Palamites, would break the link between the essence of God and the world as creation; the Platonic construction of metaphysical entities out of the mystical experience, which—based on those visions of light—leads to the creation of a sphere of "divine energy" which stands between the substance of God and the world; and, finally, the irrationalism which asserts that the differentiation between substance and energy in God contradicts the idea of simplicity of divine essence, on the grounds that logic cannot cope with matters divine, and that it is godless to argue, by means of syllogism and logic, against the facts of mystical experience which give proof of that sphere of essence. This argument that metaphysical truths and conclusions can be derived directly from mystical experience, while those truths and conclusions have to be protected against rational opposition on the grounds that mere thinking can not enter into their sphere, is typical of the mystic, Platonically oriented approach. The East itself has, more recently, attempted to demonstrate how closely Palamitism is linked to the peculiar Eastern way of thinking.[8]

The spiritual rejuvenation of Orthodoxy at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in many respects comparable to Western Romanticism, emanated also from the Mount. It has already been mentioned that the higher intellectual life, the philosophical and theological teaching in the institutions of higher learning of Constantinople and Russia, had largely lost contact with old Orthodox traditions and had succumbed to a superficial Westernization. This renaissance attempted, at first, a revival of typically Eastern piety, of traditional Eastern mysticism. The Athos monk, Nikodemos, collected the mystical writings of the Palamites and those writings through which, from the fourth century on, the mystical tendency grew, or which were in any way connected with that development. This anthology of Eastern mysticism

8. Let us mention in this connection only one Russian, one Bulgarian, and one Rumanian piece of writing: *Die asketische und theologische Lehre des hl. Gregorios Palamas,* by the Russian Athos monk, Vasili Krivoshehin (Wurzburg, 1939); G. Ostrogorsky, *Athonskie isychasty i ich protivniki* (The Athos Hesychasts and Their Opponents) (Belgrade, 1931); and D. Stanislao, *Viata si invatatu ra sf. Grigorie Palama* (Herrmannstadt, 1938).

(first published in Venice in 1792 at the expense of the Rumanian prince, Ion Mavrocordatos, under the title *Philokalia*) became extremely popular and an important source of Eastern religious traditions. As early as 1793, the Russian monk, Paisi Velichovsky, translated it into Church Slavonic and gave it the title *Dobrotolubie*.[9] Nikodemos intended to publish a complete edition of the works of Gregorios Palamas, but the plan did not materialize, since all the manuscripts of the Vienna printing house were confiscated by the police, because the printer had published leaflets inciting the Greeks to revolt against their Ottoman rulers.[10]

This philosophy, which had early taken root in the Athos-directed monasteries of Wallachia and Moldavia, was transplanted, through the union of Bessarabia and Russia in 1812, into the Russian Church, where it not only influenced the spiritual life of the monasteries and the religious attitude of the people but had also, through the Startsy (the "old ones"), the spiritual leaders, a great effect upon the traditionally-minded, old-Russian Slavophilism. The first important Slavophile, Kireyevsky, was called a disciple of the Startsy.

The *Philokalia* was also a determining influence in the Sophianism of Solovyev, which is—or seeks to be—peculiarly Russian and is represented by some of the outstanding Orthodox thinkers of our time (Bulgakov, Florensky, Berdyaev). Once more we have the typically Platonic construing of the world from the Beyond, a speculative cosmology in which elements of religious experience are elevated to cosmic principles—to such an extent that a double Fall of Man is assumed: the first Fall being the tendency of matter to become individualized, and the fall of the spiritual ideas and souls into the material world; the second, representing the Fall of Man in the traditional sense. This is a re-appearance of age-old Origenistic trends, and of typically Eastern motifs which always constituted some spiritual danger in the East. In addition, we have also here—more than is generally admitted—the influence of Jacob Boehme through the medium of German Romanticism, Schelling, and Hegel; and there is logic in this, too, for

9. See also A. M. Ammann: *Die Gottesschau im palamitischen Hesychasmos* (Wurzburg, 1938), where the author says: "It may be that the theology of the *Philokalia* is different from that of the sometimes liberalizing theological schools, but its content furnishes valuable help towards an understanding of the theological ideas of the Russian people."

10. See *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, s.v. Palamas.

the Neo-Platonic element exists in all of these and, in the East, returns to its original sphere and reverts from Hegel's rational constructions to a system of mystical speculation.

The Startsy introduced another principle into the ideology of Slavophilism, that of the "spiritual church," the "bearer of the spirit." The Russian State Church was not always hospitably disposed towards the ideas of the Startsy and the influences from Athos, which found literary expression as well as social and political application in the Slavophile idea. Indeed, the Church was, at times, openly hostile to it.

The spiritual guidance and popular education which the Startsy undertook on the basis of their ascetic rank and mystical vocation, yet often without official Church sanction, led to frequent clashes with the state authorities. The more strongly this antagonism made itself felt, the more forcefully did the revival of ancient mystical Eastern ideas express itself in those circles where the influence of the Startsy was strongest: ideas according to which the mystic, the bearer of the spirit, could guide souls and act as confessor, even though he had never taken vows.[11] The idea of the bearer of the spirit, applied to the masses of the faithful, had a decisive influence upon the development of the Orthodox idea of the Church as it was first represented by the Russian Slavophiles and has now been accepted by almost all of Orthodoxy, and upon the development of nationalism among the Orthodox peoples.

THE RISE OF SLAVOPHILISM

In discussions of the Orthodox idea of the Church, Orthodox circles often quote the formula established by the Patriarchs in their reply to an encyclical of Pope Pius VII, in 1848: "The hierarchy is not the bearer of church authority, nor is it infallible in matters of faith. The people as a whole are the guardians of the faith." This corresponds to the ideas of Khomyakov on the nature of the Orthodox Church (Khomyakov was called the first Russian Apostolic Father by I. Samarin). There is no outside authority for matters of the faith: what often passes as such—the decisions of the councils, the teaching authority of the hierarchy—are but testimonials of the faith which lives in the Church and are binding because they give proof of the faith of the Church, i.e., of the community of believers; the latter are them-

11. See K. Höll, *Enthusiasmus und Bussegewalt* (Leipzig, 1898).

selves infallible, because they carry the spirit of God and love in themselves. The true faith goes with love; only love receives it; truth is in the harmony of all believers. The only criterion of truth, therefore, is the revelation of the spirit which lives in the Church. Through their inner knowledge of faith, the Church and its members know the unity of their unchangeable spirit, which is that of God. A council becomes ecumenical (general) only when its decision is accepted by all the faithful, who see in it an expression of their faith.[12] Through Khomyakov's disciples, Bulgakov and Florensky, this interpretation has become an integral part of the ideology of all Orthodox churches, including those outside Russia.[13]

This interpretation has not always prevailed, though it was proclaimed quite early. Eastern Christians long before, in opposition to the alleged improvements and the willfulness of the hierarchy, insisted that tradition is not perpetuated by the hierarchy but by the faithful, who form the Church, even if the hierarchy and the people should part company. This was the position of the Raskolniki, the Old Believers, who were hostile to the patriarchate of Moscow, because they thought that it had fallen into heresy, and were later opponents of the Russian State Church. They received the answer of the Orthodox Church through the patriarch Joachim: "We do not burn and torture for the sake of cross and prayer;[14] we burn because you call us heretics and you do not obey the Holy Church. As for the sign of the cross, do as you please." In the state law of 1906 (Par. 64), the Russian State Church expresses itself as follows: "As a Christian ruler, the Russian emperor is the chief protector and guardian of the dogma of the Greek-Russian faith and overseer of the faith and of law and order in the Holy Church. For that reason he is the head of the Church." For the same reason, Peter the Great told a church delegation which had asked for the

12. See also N. Arseniev, *Die Kirche des Morgenlandes* (Berlin, 1926), ch. v. Selections from Khomyakov's writings can be found in the collection, *Östliches Christentum, Dokumente,* Vol. I (Munich, 1923).

13. See also the book of the Bulgarian scholar, Zankov, *Das orthodoxe Christentum des Ostens* (Berlin, 1928), and that of the Rumanian, N. Crainic, *Orthodoxie si Etnocratie* (Bucharest, 1940). Bulgakov's book, *Orthodoxie,* has also been translated into Rumanian and is often quoted.

14. The Raskolniki considered the adjustment of old Russian texts to the Greek originals, the improved orthography of the holy names (Iisus for Isus) and the sign of the cross with three fingers instead of with two, which was considered the old Russian custom, as a denial of the traditional faith.

reappointment of a patriarch: "Here is your patriarch," pointing to himself.

The essence of the old Orthodoxy is not in the idea of the people's church, but in the absolute traditionalism, the exact preservation of the dogma of the seven holy councils, guaranteed by the authority of the hierarchy or, later, by the authority of the state. That the Raskolnik principle of the people's church could oppose the principles of hierarchy and State Church on traditional grounds is a tragic feature.[15] The old Orthodoxy did not hesitate to sacrifice the principle of traditionalism in favor of the hierarchy. The patriarchate and State Church were interested not in the sign of the cross with two fingers or with three, but in submission or non-submission to Church (i.e., State Church) authority; while the Raskolniki talked themselves more and more into the idea of a spiritual church, until they were eventually so far removed from the original principle of the Orthodox Church as to recognize the possibility that a priestless Church could be the only true one, while the Church in the hands of the state had become a church of Antichrist.[16]

The disciples of Khomyakov[17] criticize the seventeenth century catechisms (that of Peter Mogila and of the Synod of Jassy in 1642, and that of the Jerusalem Synod of 1672, which was inspired and guided by the Patriach Dositheos) because of their "Catholic" character. Modern Orthodox circles claim that it was un-Orthodox to draw up such catechisms, and that they can not be accepted as binding. In fact, it was Slavophilism which transferred the idea of the "spiritual church" (the church idea of the Raskolniki) into the State Church, the totalitarianism of which it criticized no less sharply than the Raskolniki. Ivan Aksakov said, in 1850: "Russia will soon be split in two parts; Orthodoxy will side with the State and the government, with the unbelieving nobility, and with the clergy which repels the people; everybody else will turn to the Raskolniki." Of the State Church, he had this to say: "Here rules the horror of devastation in holy places, spiritual death spreads instead of spiritual life, the sword of war replaces that of the spirit and, instead of Angels and Archangels of God, we

15. V. Solovyev has made this very clear; see the German translation of his *Monarchia* (Mainz, 1929), pp. 168-72, 292-94.

16. The Raskolniki took Peter the Great for the Antichrist; see also *Östliches Christentum, Dokumente.*

17. See Zankov, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 74, 75.

find policemen standing at the walls of the churches guiding the Russian conscience." This is really the attitude of the Raskolniki, who said that they did not want to pray to the God of popes and policemen, but only to the true God. Among the non-Slavophiles some as, for instance, Chaadayev and Gagarin, praised Western Catholicism, which they placed far above the paralyzed and politically gagged State Church.[18] The liberals denied the Church and church tradition altogether. While Slavophilism attempted to find a theoretic foundation for the trinity of Orthodoxy-Autocracy-Nationality, as then proclaimed by the State Church, it did so in a manner which might almost be called democratic and was not entirely acceptable to the state authorities. Many Slavophiles were under police surveillance (Aksakov was arrested and cross-examined). This was because they tried to defend the ideas of the government on an entirely different spiritual basis. They drew their inspiration from the Eastern mystical interpretation of faith, which (though only within the limits of a mode of life at once contemplative and ascetic) had almost developed into the idea of the "spiritual church."

THE ORTHODOX INTERPRETATION OF CHURCH, STATE, AND NATION

The ideas of the Startsy, the bearers of the spirit without regard to their position in the autocratic State Church, had only to be transferred to the believers; the mystical idea of faith as expressed in the writings of Athos, which were popular even among the masses, needed only to be attributed to the whole body of believers of the true faith to become the basis of that true faith, and Khomyakov's theory of the "people of the true faith" as the bearer of Orthodoxy—the God-bearing people in the Dostoyevskian sense—became a reality.[19]

This made an important change in the idea of Orthodoxy. The Slavophiles did not hesitate to view in their own way the church of the past; for example, Ivan Samarin, in his treatise on Stefan Yavorsky and Feofan Prokopovich, clerical advisers to Peter the Great, argued that these two clerics represented the two false unilateral philosophies (the Catholic-hierarchic and the Protestant-individualistic), and stood

18. See also T. G. Masaryk, *loc. cit.*

19. See *Ein russisches Pilgerleben; ein russisches Manuskript aus der Mitte des 19ten Jahrhunderts,* translated by R. V. Walter (Berlin, 1925) for details concerning the popularity and the influence of mystical writings.

in direct opposition to the Russian Church, which embodied the true spirit of the church. As a matter of fact, the state deprived Yavorsky only of the "spiritual sword," which Yavorsky himself in his essay, "Of the Rock of Faith," had presented, together with the "secular sword," as belonging to the patriarch. The autocratic church replaced the hierarchical one: Stefan Yavorsky, who had been administrator of the vacant patriarchal see, became clerical president of the Holy Synod, which was a department of the state. But the autocratic State Church remained just as totalitarian as the hierarchical church, the patriarchate, had been. Opposed to both were the representatives of the "spiritual church," the Raskolniki. Only in the synthesis of Slavophilism, in the extension of the monk's mystical principle of faith over the whole of the Church, and in its elevation to a criterion of the true faith (as contrasted with totalitarian traditionalism), did the two extremes of Orthodoxy come to be linked together: the Tsar, the image of God,[20] and the Starets, the bearer of the spirit, mystically inspired to guide and teach. The two divergent tendencies of Orthodoxy—Constantinople and Athos, State Church and Raskol—were brought to a common denominator by virtue of the mystical principle of faith. For the hierarchic-autocratic principle of the church is valid only in so far as it is an expression of the faith which lives and works in each and every member of the Church, and this inner certainty is the real foundation of the true faith. According to the Slavophiles, the inner principle of the "spiritual church" pervades the framework of the State Church.

That is to say, it was to pervade it. But the question arises whether, in this manner, the realm of the Church did not become subordinate to the realm of the State. The "spiritual church" could be the visible Church only because both, in the idea of the "Christian people," coincide: the people inwardly motivated by the spirit of the true faith; outwardly a definite political entity, organized into the Russian State and into the State Church. If this were not so, the invisible church of the "bearers of the spirit" would remain without any connection with the visibly organized Russian State Church, while, in actuality, the Slavophiles, in spite of all criticism, were aiming at a spiritual and religious justification of the visible Russian Church. Thus the Slavo-

20. Archbishop Filaret, of Moscow, says: "God has given us the omnipotent Tsar in the image of His omnipotent rule."

philes arrived at a somewhat "charismatic" idea of a people whose position as "bearer of the spirit" is guaranteed by its very traditions and its nature as a people. With this, Khomyakov went beyond the idea of the "spiritual church"; he extended its sphere to the traditional and national, or, rather, the spirit of the true faith became an attribute of the nationally traditional. He achieved what Solovyev called the "Russification of the gifts of the Holy Spirit." Khomyakov thus represents not only the Eastern mystical idea of the "spiritual church," but he also shows traces of the heritage of the German Romanticists and of Herder. While the Western interpretation knows how to separate the people from the state, Khomyakov, of necessity, considered people, state, and church one whole. The state, to him, could never have a sphere of its own, separate from the people; nor could the people exist in a purely secular sphere independent of the religious. Theoretically speaking, everything is subordinate to the clerical-religious; even the social and political development of the state is determined by the religious; in practice, however, the church—which possesses no independent spiritual potential, no separate sphere of its own, but is only one aspect of the entity which, looked at from a different angle, can also be people or state—is completely subordinated to the only actual power among these different "aspects," the state.

Through the equation of church, people, and state, the Slavophiles succeeded in utilizing the mystically interpreted piety of the individual for the service of the state; they proved theoretically what the autocratic system had only been able to decree: "It is God's command to obey the Tsar, not from fear but from conscience" (see par. 1 of the State Law of 1832). Bulgakov, in his *L'Orthodoxie,* which deals with Orthodoxy and the State, speaks about a "hierarchical power" of the Tsar which is supposedly in harmony with the clerical power. This dangerous dualism in the Slavophile idea of the people's church found splendid expression in the essay which Dostoyevsky had Ivan Karamazov write: ". . . even justice should be subordinate to the church." That is the tenor of the essay; the aim is the conversion of the entire world and, with it also, the originally pagan state into the Church. The Church is to be the master of the world—so be it, adds the monk Paisti, and continues, *"ex oriente lux."* But the public feels that what is actually meant is the exact reverse; even atheists applaud the essay,

and the intelligentsia assert that it is actually nothing but a piece of arrogant mockery.

EUROPE AND ORTHODOXY

Nothing characterizes the spiritual contrast between East and West more thoroughly than the completely different development of the originally mystical idea of the "spiritual church." That idea, as has been pointed out, existed also in the West, and was just as much an element of the spiritual growth there. But the typical, humane-humanistic tendency of the West guided it towards the sphere of nature and reason. The absolute sovereignty of the directly inspired mystic became the freedom of the natural-reasonable personality; the absolute liberty of the "bearer of the spirit," who obeyed only his inspiration, became naturally and reasonably oriented, because the guiding principle of the liberated individuality was not only a mystical inspiration, but the principle of reason itself, which henceforth was to be obeyed, not as an external rule but as an inner spontaneous law of action. Thus the "bearer of the spirit" became a man of reason who either, in the name of reason, negated religion altogether, or accepted it as an objective norm and revealed truth, founded upon the sphere of reason, but who would by no means deny the principle of revelation in the religious field for the sake of an inner, irrational-mystical principle in the natural sphere of reason. In the mystically oriented East, however, which did not separate reason and religion, and did not accept an independent sphere of secular values, the principle of the "spiritual church" led of necessity to the idea of "self-prophecy," as it was called by Solovyev: the evaluation of all inner, subjective sensation as a higher norm, as prophetic inspiration, regardless of the rationally-reasonable on the one hand, or the religious-revealed on the other. This resulted logically in a system of pietist sects and complete anarchy, which was all the more dangerous as it was religious rather than non-political.

If, on the other hand, one attempts to utilize the idea of the "spiritual church" to justify actually existing conditions, if one attempts to prove that the historically established Russian Church is necessary from the unilateral-mystical point of view and is the "spiritual church" every member of which is inspired, then the spirit becomes the slave of the actually existing; the secular power, the autocracy (for the Russian Church which the Slavophiles wanted to put on a philosophical basis was in the hands of the Autocracy) is adorned with a mystic-re-

ligious aspect. Kinship with the exterior political-national community and religious subordination thereto become criteria of inner spiritual inspiration, and the Autocracy, in addition to its actual supremacy over the visible church, receives mystical power over the inspired "spiritual church." The national becomes a religious element, and God (as Dostoyevsky expressed it in the *Demons*) becomes an attribute of the Russian people. And this goes for each and every one of the Orthodox national churches and for all the Orthodox peoples of the European East, whose nationalism is thus given a mystical intensification as well as an ecstatic elevation.

That is the difference between European nationalism and mystic-orthodox nationalism. European nationalism considers the national a secular element; the secular sphere makes possible the negation of the religious, or the subordination of the latter to the former, or the religious sphere can be rationalized; but in no case will European nationalism, claiming that it is in itself a church, combine the religious sphere with the secular one. Nor will the people's community—a historical, racial fact—be interpreted as a matter of inner mystical inspiration, which must lead to confusion of the irrational, anti-secular and anti-cultural consciousness of mystical inspiration with the national consciousness. Europeans are a people; Khomyakov's people are a community of inspired Russians, a community of monks and mystics on a large scale.

POPULAR MESSIANISM: REVIEW AND PROSPECTS

Messianism is an integral factor of the Orthodox interpretation of the people. A people which claims to possess the religious truth of the Beyond must, in its existence, represent in some way the realization of Heaven on Earth, the descent of the spirit into the visible world. It must demand that everyone acknowledge the truth thus realized—not claiming to be called upon to guide the others, for that would be secular instead of spiritual thinking—but expecting the others to become like itself, though the others cannot change without ceasing to be what they are. As soon as that people abandons its claim to be, in its entirety, identical with the "spiritual church," its idea of the Church will become that of a spiritual sect and will no longer be orthodox in the sense in which modern Orthodoxy interprets the idea of church and people. Thus, Orthodoxy has to face the alternative: either the

identification of the "spiritual church" with the believing people, of a spiritually illuminated community of believers with the community of those who live within the same people's church, must be abandoned (i.e., the basic orthodox principle will have to be sacrificed), or the nation must be interpreted mystically and messianically. Proof of the important role of messianism in the Orthodox idea can be found in the Russian belief that Russia enjoyed a providential position among the nations—even at a time when neither her cultural nor her political position warranted any such assumption and, furthermore, in the fact that the popular messianism lost nothing of its effectiveness when the Russia of the right faith accepted atheistic communism.

It has been pointed out before that the irrationalism of mystical Eastern thinking and its tendency to build exclusively on the religious, with complete disregard for reason, nature, and the secular, results in insufficient immunization against the attacks of rationalistic and materialistic thought. A philosophy like that of the West which combines its religious thinking with the natural and reasonable can oppose attacks against religion with purely reasonable arguments; an ideology, on the other hand, which bases everything—religious, ethical and even political values—on faith must collapse completely when reason, which cannot be disregarded in the long run, seems to contradict religious thinking. This collapse, this change from the mystically and religiously founded thinking to an entirely superficial, rational-reasonable, materialistic one, is expressed in communism; but messianism has remained. The belief in the Russian Church of State and people, already undermined by the sects and finally destroyed by the revolution, has been replaced by the belief in the doctrine of communism and in Russia's mandate to propagate that doctrine everywhere. Psychologically speaking, this belief is just as mystical as the earlier belief in the exclusive and providential loyalty of Russia to the faith. It may sound paradoxical, but it is true; a communist Russia which aims at communist world domination is the last stage of the Orthodox idea of church and people. Theologically, communist Russia is Heaven on Earth, realized by a messianic people, the selected representatives of exclusive, universal truth which will make the whole world happy.

The situation is not altered at all by the fact that we are dealing no longer with religious truth, but with a social scheme, materialistically developed, undermining and ruining on principle all national values.

There is logic in this development of the Orthodox idea: the assumption that an entire people, with all its historic institutions, could become the exclusive bearer of religious truth from the Beyond, based on mystical inspiration, was so audacious that the Slavophiles themselves were terrified by their own idea of the God-bearing people. And it takes but little indoctrination for a people to find—through a revolution which turned everything inside out—a social organization which is to be the only just and right one for all peoples, regardless of culture and national characteristics, which, therefore, can be forced down their throats at the expense of their own nationality. The doctrine was inherent in the revolution itself, and the messianic consciousness of the people, the Orthodox heritage, did the rest. This was predicted almost a century ago by Gagarin, who put it with frightening clarity:

> The Slavophiles assert that the Russian people is a chosen people, the cream of all peoples, as it is the guardian of orthodoxy and possesses the only good, traditionally and religiously logical, form of government, the Autocracy. But the Russians will gladly sacrifice both orthodoxy and autocracy once they find out that Russian messianism—which is all they are interested in—can be more efficiently proven in a different manner.

That is exactly what happened in the case of communism. It is Russian messianism on a revolutionary basis, instead of a traditional-autocratic one; it is Orthodoxy on an anti-Christian instead of Christian basis. But, in its essentials, it is just as Orthodox as the Orthodoxy of the Slavophiles.

Finally, we must ask whether the mystic-Platonic philosophy must lead to the Orthodox idea. By no means. As long as it remains aware of the fact that it is solely a formula for the secular in search of the Beyond, for the elevation of the temporary to the eternal, in short, a formula for the transcendence of the religious, it will not only be justified, but may even be a more adequate formula than that which arrives at the existence of the divine empirically, on the basis of the purely secular, and introduces the religious afterwards. (The formula may be more adequate by virtue of the contention that love for the divine and the search for it already constitutes a rudimentary knowledge thereof.) To attach too little importance, on the other hand, to the sphere of the natural and reasonable is a shortcoming of that philosophy for which it could account only before a forum of philoso-

phers and theologians; the rational philosophy alone is, at any rate, just as one-sided, and only the synthesis of the two can result in a satisfactory ideology. For that reason, the first typically European and Western act of the spiritual life of the Middle Ages was the synthesis of the rationalism of Aristotle and the Platonism of Augustine, which occurred in Scholasticism.

It is the extreme application of this philosophy to a field which is contrary to its very nature that results in the Orthodox interpretation. It is a dualistic philosophy which minimizes and negates the human-secular sphere more, perhaps, than is warranted by the intrinsic ontological value of the natural sphere, or by the intrinsic theological value of the created one. To use it to demonstrate the realization of the Beyond in the secular, the visible—not merely in a small number of chosen men who are able to put themselves entirely beyond the world, and to live entirely "in the spirit," but in a whole people, its visible church and state organization, its concrete national spirit as history presents it—is the complete negation and reversion of the philosophy and of the transcendency of the religious.

If knowledge and love can be no more than the search for something which can never be quite realized in the temporary and secular, a visible church, a visible nationhood of which every member is a "bearer of the spirit" and possessor of the truth of the Beyond, becomes an impossibility. There is left only one secular community of individuals on a natural, racial, and historical basis, free from any religious connection—the people; only a Church which guides, teaches, and transmits and fosters the "spirit," but which cannot be such a thing as the "community of the bearers of the spirit," of the inspired. The logical outcome will be something like the Western formula for the relationship of church and people or state. Only if—contrary to the basic principle—the transcendent is believed to have been realized, and not only prepared, in the visible and concrete, will the equation of the "spiritual" with the visible become possible; in actuality, however, this would mean the surrender of the spirit to the visible, of the church principle to the principle of autocracy. On the secular plane, this would result in the materialistic doctrine of communism, permeated with mystical faith and proclaimed as the religion of the world, the complete subjugation of the spirit by the visible and material—Orthodoxy with secular contents, but religiously evaluated. And where

the Christian content of Orthodoxy has been retained, the messianism of the "people of the true faith" will result.

Do all Orthodox churches have to follow this development? Not at all. Like the Protestant churches, they can consider themselves churches among other churches; they can claim, perhaps, to represent a purer form of Christianity, but they do not need to insist upon a nationalism based upon it as the Slavophiles claimed. Such a nationalism, which unified the people, church and state into a hierarchic, cosmic frame—the kind of nationalism which has recently been given its theoretic foundations in Rumania—must necessarily be messianic. For this reason, it is not European and has no place on a European continent, the life of which depends upon the co-operation of co-ordinated nations.

THE ROLE OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST

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The nature and strategy of the Christian mission in the East has been the subject of careful re-examination and lively debate in recent decades, beginning with the publication of the report of the "Laymen's Inquiry."[1] In recent ecumenical conferences, themselves products in part of the mission movement and drawing constructive leadership from the "younger churches" of the East, three major viewpoints have dominated discussion. One has been called by William Ernest Hocking the strategy of "radical displacement." It holds that Christianity is so radically different from all other faiths and that all faiths are so closely bound up with total *weltanschauungen* that there can be no mediating witness in the Christian mission, though there may be minor cultural accommodations and adaptations. The issue is drawn between truth and error, not between half-truth and full truth. Opposed to this view is that championed by American and other liberals who believe that significant revelation is found in religions other than Christianity, and that the best possible world faith would be a synthesis of the "best" elements in all living religions. A third view, set forth by Professor Hocking in his *Living Religions and a World Faith*,[2] holds that Christianity is distinctive and unique, but holds also with the liberals that Christianity, up to the present, has failed to incorporate or develop some fruitful insights into the nature of God and man found in other religions. Hocking, therefore, suggests a "way of reconception," believing that each of the living religions may find within itself a unique witness to truth, though this truth be distorted in various ways in various institutional expressions and emphases. Such reconception of Christianity as a faith as distinguished from Christianity as an institutional religion may, in turn, reveal that Christianity in principle embodies more of that

1. *Rethinking Missions, A Laymen's Inquiry after one hundred years* (New York, 1932).

2. (New York, 1940).

which is needed to meet universal religious need than is found in any other world faith.

The writer had the opportunity, in the summer of 1949, to reflect on each of these strategies in the context of the East-West Philosophers' Conference which met for six weeks at The University of Hawaii. The announced purpose of the conference, sponsored by the Rockefeller, Watamull, and McInerny Foundations, and The University of Hawaii, was "to explore the possibility of a world philosophy through the synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and the West" in the realms of philosophical methodology, metaphysics, and ethics, without special emphasis on the religions of the world as believed in and practiced in East and West. The reflection was in a philosophical context, therefore, against the background of a conference in which theological issues entered only indirectly. Among the senior members of the conference were one Ceylonese and two Japanese Buddhists; five Hindus; a Chinese Neo-Confucianist, a Chinese Christian, and a British Christian student of Chinese thought; and ten Americans, of whom seven are identified with the empirical-naturalistic tradition. It is understood that unsuccessful efforts were made to have Roman Catholic and other Western traditions represented. As it developed, however, most of the discussion involved a comparison of Western naturalism and realism with Therevada (Hīnayāna) and Zen (Chan) Buddhism, Advaita Vedānta, and Neo-Confucianism. At the same time, it soon became apparent that Eastern schools do not recognize a sharp distinction between philosophy and religion, and that much of the technical philosophizing of the East occurs in a framework of what most Westerners would term philosophy of religion. Furthermore, it was discovered that nine of the twenty-five Western associate members and five of the twenty-two senior members of the conference had attended Christian theological schools in the course of their professional training, and that eighteen of the forty-seven members of the conference now identify themselves with the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Therefore, there was a considerable amount of formal and informal discussion of the relation of Hebrew-Christian ideas and ideals to those of the Eastern traditions represented and to those of Western naturalism.

As a result of this re-examination, the writer finds himself closer to Hocking's position on the Eastern mission of Christianity than to either of the other two outlined above. The issues of our day lie not

simply between Christianity and other religions, but also between various world faiths and various forms of irreligion. It seems that each of the major religious traditions of the East has an important witness for our day, and though the witness of Christianity may be crucial in certain areas discussed below, that witness can be effective only if Christians acquaint themselves more intelligently than is usually the case with the living messages of other religions—as seen from the inside by intelligent believers rather than from the outside perspective of Christian apologetic. Furthermore, the presentation of mature, non-reductionistic naturalism, in this and other recent discussion, suggests that lines are not to be drawn too simply between theism and naturalism, or "Christianity and secularism," as it is sometimes put. Rather it seems, from the Christian point of view, that, in our day as well as in others, God has not left Himself without witness in many groups using many idioms, and it may be that frequently the distortion of His Word in Christian witness causes it to be heard more clearly in non-Christian classrooms and temples than in Christian churches and colleges. If this be true, it would seem more important for Christianity that the word be heard than that it be heard in words congenial to one group or all groups of Christians. Christians are called to humble re-examination and reconception of their faith, and to rejoicing in the truth wherever discovered and proclaimed. To substantiate further these convictions, we shall examine briefly some of the findings of the East-West Philosophers' Conference in each of the three areas with which it was primarily concerned: philosophical methodology, metaphysics, and ethics.

PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY

It was generally agreed that all of the Eastern philosophies represented at the conference have a primarily practical rather than a theoretical orientation—that Eastern philosophy, in the main, has concerned itself more with ways of living than with ways of thinking. For the East, philosophy is "philosophy of life," and there has not been in the East the enthusiasm for analysis as an end in itself or for the disinterested manipulation of postulational concepts which has characterized much Western philosophy. As one of the Westerners put it, it seems that the West has wanted to *see* the real, while the East has wanted to *be* the real. The distinction between Western "concepts by postulation" and Eastern "concepts by intuition" suggested by F.S.C.

Northrop, in his *The Meeting of East and West,*[3] and further developed and defended by him at the conference, was recognized by all to have some validity and to be a stimulating generalization. At the same time, sharp exception was taken by both Easterners and Westerners to specific developments and applications of this distinction proposed by Northrop. Nevertheless, both Hindu and Buddhist philosophers declared that their systems are never divorced from the quest for salvation; and the Neo-Confucianists, while disavowing the otherworldly reference of other Easterners, reaffirmed the traditional Confucian-Taoist view of philosophy as primarily a way of life. It was further agreed that, generally speaking, the West is convinced that the result of any significant inquiry should be expressible in verbal symbols subject to clearly defined and accepted rules of logic or syntax, while the East has also respected claims to knowledge which cannot be communicated verbally. Relatedly, the West has tended to center its attention on the external world, while the East has been more concerned with knowledge of the self in its spiritual depths and potentialities. All of these differences crystallize in the centrality of "intuition" for Eastern thought and the Western difficulty with all that is implied in that term.

From the Christian point of view, it was interesting to note an apparent analogy between the Easterners' difficulty in explaining what they mean by "intuition" and the difficulty of the Christian philosopher in speaking of "revelation" to his colleagues. Again and again, the Easterners attempted to make clear that they are not talking about esoteric or magical knowledge; again and again, the Western naturalists assumed that they must be—or that, at most, they mean a kind of synoptic knowledge which comes in "hunches" or "flashes of insight." Vedantists and Buddhists alike patiently explained that "higher" or "saving" knowledge, as they understand it, presupposes intense moral and physical as well as intellectual discipline, and that it is not irrational, though it is not merely rational. It involves, they said, the total commitment of the total person and is not restricted to any one type of noetic activity—not even to "mystical experience." The illumination which comes in higher knowledge is not, indeed, *an* instance of cognition of *an* object at all, but is, rather, productive of an orientation and attitude towards all possible experience, including cognitive

3. (New York, 1947).

experience. The Hindus referred frequently to their traditional doctrine of many *mārgas* leading to the experience of Brahman, including the paths of good works, devotional practices, and intellectual inquiry as well as meditation. The Buddhists also pointed to the many paths offered in Buddhism, particularly in the Northern schools, while the Chinese mentioned the mingling of Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist ways in the practical religious quest of their people. From all came frequent suggestions that saving knowledge or illumination comes to the seeker more as a gift than as an attainment. There are obvious analogies to be found in Christian discussions of grace and revelation.

Also, both Easterners and Westerners present suggested analogies between Eastern intuitional methodology and Western existentialism. D. T. Suzuki, noted Japanese Zen Buddhist scholar, said in an exposition of the difficult Zen doctrine of *prajña,*

> *prajña* does not mean a mere intellectual discipline; nor is it a kind of dialectic whereby contradictoriness becomes logically tenable and turns into a reasonable proposition. *Prajña* is existential and not dialectical, as Kierkegaard might say. It does not work with logical formulas and abstractions. It is a concrete fact in itself. . . . Kierkegaard states that faith is an existential leap. So is *prajña*-intuition. Faith has a Christian ring, while *prajña* is specifically intellectual.

Similar statements were made by the Hindus as they expounded the techniques and goal of meditation in Vedānta. It appears that Buddhists, Hindus, Taoists, and, to some extent, Confucianists, as well as Christians are all concerned with knowledge which is more than theoretical understanding and involves moral and spiritual as well as intellectual discipline. For all of them, philosophical method must embrace a kind of knowledge which comes only in the active commitment of the total person, in contrast to other views which emphasize the theoretical and "objective" character of knowledge in the discussion of method. A Hindu Swami said to one of the Western naturalists present, in a discussion of this point, "I am afraid that if you saw two doors, one marked 'This way to knowledge about the Kingdom of God' and the other marked 'This way into the Kingdom of God' you would choose to enter the first door." Hindus and Christians agreed with the Buddhists, when they said that the first and last words about methodology in religious knowledge are Gautama's: 'Come, and *see.*"

And yet there are important differences between Eastern and Christian forms of existentialism, and these differences also emerged in the discussions. It was noted that, for both Buddhists and Advaita Vedantists, the goal of life is loss of the self and, for the latter at least, realization of unity with the Absolute.

> *Prajña*-intuition is the continuum becoming conscious of itself. When it perceives itself as itself as it is in itself, there is *prajña*-experience. Therefore, there is here no differentiation of subject and object. What is perceived is the percipient itself, and the percipient is no other body than the perceived; the two are in a perfect state of identification; indeed, even to speak of identification is apt to mislead us to the assumption of two objects which are identified in the act of intuition. . . . There have never been two from the very first. It was by the human act of knowing that God divided Himself and came to be conscious of Himself as God yet not God. Therefore, Buddhism starts with a negation, with denying knowledge, with contradicting human experience which is fundamentally rooted in bifurcation. Buddhists have realized that this is the only way to reach the bottomless abyss of the Godhead where God remains God and no process of becoming not-God has begun. Here we cannot talk about intuition or identification; there is only an absolute state of self-identity.

Thus, the Zen Buddhist.

Again, the Advaita Vedantist: "As the mind becomes purified, the spiritual nature of the soul reveals itself to the seeker, and the knowledge of his identity with Brahman or ultimate Reality becomes clear." The Christian must contrast this, of course, with the Hebrew-Christian insistence on the otherness of God even in deepest spiritual communion. Even so, the Hindus point out that Advaita is only one school of Vedānta, and that others, such as Rāmānuja's, teach that communion with a personal God rather than union with an impersonal Absolute is the goal of Vedānta—and that there is room in Hinduism for both views. Similarly, the Buddhists point to theistic schools in Buddhism, as exemplified, for instance, in the Amida sects, in which perfect communion with a personal savior is the height of devotion. And the Neo-Confucianists affirm that their teachings never point to loss of the self as the end of life; when they speak of "becoming one with Nature," they mean harmonious communion with Nature based on perfect adjustment and accommodation. The Easterners, in turn, call attention to the writings of Christian mystics in which the description of the

beatific vision leaves the distinction between communion and union with God very thin. Nevertheless, the Christian must affirm that the distinction is there if the vision is Christian, and he must suggest that the very fact that Buddhism and Hinduism include personal communion with a personal God as merely one way among many, frequently with the suggestion that it is especially fitting for the spiritually immature, reveals the basic monism of both schools. At the same time, is would appear that further study and sympathetic comparison may reveal additional points of agreement on the basic questions of philosophical and theological method.

One other question which became central in the discussions of methodology is of special interest in the context of this essay: Does a philosophical method have valuational presuppositions? Eastern and Western thinkers of all schools appeared to recognize some such presuppositions. The Easterners, indeed, took it for granted that significant inquiry must have moral and spiritual bases, as was shown in the exposition of their general existentialist view. And, for them, the recognition of valuational presuppositions in methodology poses no serious problem, because there is general agreement among them as to what the fundamental values are. For the Westerners, however, the question proved to be a difficult issue creating sharp debate. Some held that value-presuppositions largely determine the criteria of evidence, and that empirical method alone is unable to account for or justify them; others held that the knowledge that method is based on valuational presuppositions is itself arrived at empirically, and that empirical method itself exemplifies loyalty to a value-system. Now, in this connection, it would seem that philosophers of the Christian tradition should be able to point towards a position which incorporates major values of both Eastern and naturalistic Western methodology. Like the Eastern traditions, the Christian tradition has always recognized valuational bases of inquiry. On the other hand, Christian convictions expressed in such doctrines as the doctrine of creation, the sovereignty of God, and the perennial peril of idolatry in all human pursuits including inquiry, and the Christian view of evolving and temporal revelation—all of these and others have led Christians to recognize elements of objectivity and novel discovery in inquiry which the Easterners tend to minimize. An intelligently constructed philosophy of method which accurately reflects relevant Christian doctrine

would, it seems, serve as a corrective for both the Eastern tendency towards a highly valuational but subjective methodology and the Western tendency towards experimental and objective but *wertfrei* methodology.

METAPHYSICS

The chief significance of the findings of the seminar on metaphysics lies in the acceptance by the Eastern members of certain metaphysical doctrines which many had supposed to be distinctively Western. It was discovered that, in this and other areas, there is now no clearly definable "Eastern" point of view, just as there is no unambiguous "Western" viewpoint. Rather, certain ideas have received and continue to receive more emphasis in Eastern metaphysical discussion than in Western, and vice versa, but most major ideas are found in some form in the philosophies of all cultures. Recognition of this plurality of metaphysical viewpoints, East and West, should lead Christian philosophers to a plurality of approaches in apologetic, and to cultivation of careful and precise distinctions *in lieu* of misleading generalizations.

For instance, there was general agreement that the object of metaphysical inquiry is "reality," and that reality is knowable by reason, intuition, or both. Furthermore, the Easterners were eager to affirm that one important mode of reality is the changing, finite realm of spatio-temporal relativity. The Indians and Buddhists affirmed that, when they speak of the finite world as "māyā," they do not mean that it is psychologically illusory, nor do they use the term as a value-term. For them the realm of *māyā* is not unimportant, though it is not supremely important. Christian philosophers should be able to understand and appreciate such an estimate of "this world."

Furthermore, there was common agreement that there is something more ultimate than man, in terms of which man and the rest of reality are to be understood. Eastern and Western naturalists alike disavowed a simple humanism and showed that religious awe, wonder, and devotion are appropriate in at least some naturalistic systems. This suggests that Christian apologists would do well to examine the practical attitudes of those who, for various theoretical reasons, deny the supernatural, rather than argue so much about the theoretical bases for the attitudes. Much of the argument about naturalism versus supernaturalism, it appears, springs from unexamined definitions and

mutual misunderstanding if not distrust—especially with reference to alleged ethical consequences of the respective positions. Similarly, it was agreed in the metaphysics seminar that human nature includes both a physical aspect which links it with other organic and inorganic nature, and another aspect through which an individual is related to entities other than these, and which enables man freely to imagine and strive for ends rationally understood and freely chosen. The common recognition by men of varying traditions of the uniqueness of personality suggests that many arguments about man's "spiritual nature" or "soul" are as fruitless as many arguments about the existence of the supernatural.

A further agreement on a matter which stands at the boundary between metaphysics and ethics was expressed in the seminar statement that "in the human order the individual alone is the bearer of rational and spiritual faculties." The human group, it was asserted, is not a super-individual organism containing its members within itself as subordinate organs. It is, rather, a moral union of co-operative individual activities founded on a common purpose and ideology. The acceptance of this thesis means, of course, the rejection of exclusive social determinism, and means that the varying traditions as interpreted by their Conference representatives form a common front against all forms of totalitarian collectivism.

Finally, moving on from the border line between metaphysics and ethics—and the border is often difficult to find in discussions of the kind described—there was wide agreement that moral value-terms refer to reality which is independent of individual or cultural judgment or decree. The naturalists present were eager to disavow the crude cultural relativism often associated with naturalistic views and to avoid the fallacy which Northrop describes as "mistaking 'ought' for 'is.'" Though much additional discussion is needed regarding the consistency of the affirmation with the various theoretical frameworks represented, it is clear that careful inquiry and patient attempts at understanding rather than facile caricaturing are in order for Christian philosophers as well as their colleagues.

ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Some of the findings of the seminar on ethics and social philosophy are anticipated in the foregoing discussion. Here again, it was noted

that complexity characterizes all the systems represented and that pat stereotypes must be overcome before intelligent discussion may proceed. In general, it seems that each of the major traditions represented has found a place within its ethical and social doctrine for all sorts and conditions of men, and that catholicity of theory is a prerequisite for, as well as a product of, catholicity of practice. Furthermore, rudimentary research now being undertaken by Charles Morris and others, some results of which were presented to the Conference by Professor Morris, seems to indicate a plurality of life-patterns actually preferred by different individuals and groups within cultures commonly supposed to be ideologically homogeneous. Morris' study seems to show that preference for life-patterns varies with a number of factors, physiological, economic, and cultural, as well as ideological, and suggests that any ideology which claims universality must be able to accommodate itself to and provide motivation for many different kinds of men of different temperaments and interests. In this respect, the Christian philosopher may ponder again the doctrine of the diversity of members in the Body of Christ and the necessity for free development of vocational interests related to temperamental and other factors. Protestantism, especially, would do well to re-examine its witness in this respect if the Protestant mission is to be further effective in either the West or the East.

Discussion of specific moral doctrines indicated a common emphasis on the ethics of love or compassion. "The Golden Rule" in its various "positive" and "negative" statements—and discussion revealed that the basic intent is the same regardless of varying propositional forms—appears to be a universally accepted moral ideal. Regardless of varying conceptions of the nature and destiny of man, all the major traditions represented in the Conference seem to hold that his highest duty here and now includes loving his neighbor as himself. This is, of course, a formal doctrine and can and does mean many things to many people. But discussion revealed a greater amount of common content for the doctrine than had been anticipated. There was, for instance, agreement that some form of social service is demanded by the ethic of love. Confucianism and Western naturalism have traditionally insisted on social expressions of ethical concern; Vedantists insisted that their concern for men's spiritual needs does not minimize the importance of other needs and adduced evidence from recent Indian social and political

activity in support of this claim. It appears that many Indian thinkers, like others in the East, feel driven to find in their ancient indigenous traditions new and compelling bases for democratic social reform. Similarly, the social ideal of Buddhism was interpreted as equanimity in action rather than inaction, and even the negativistic texts of Taoism were interpreted as teaching a way of action which is spontaneous and natural, as contrasted with ordinary rigidly patterned activity. The Hindu-Buddhist doctrine of *karma* was interpreted to mean freedom of self-determination—the determination of character by conduct as well as the determination of conduct by character; and the Hindus pointed out that the traditional scheme of *āśramas* has included fulfilment of social obligation as a householder as a prerequisite for further spiritual advance. Thus the Eastern traditions find positive bases for concern for this-wordly values, while the naturalists, at the same time, find room for values that others would call "spiritual" or supernatural. For the Christian philosopher, this means that in both the East and the West there are significant points of contact for both the "this-worldly" and the "other-worldly" emphases of the traditional Christian ethic.

Additional points of contact between the Christian and other views emerged in the discussion of man's ethical capacities and limitations. It appears that all of the schools represented posit some sort of freedom of the human spirit and thus some degree of "self-transcendence," to use the terminology of certain Christian writers. Confucianists and naturalists would describe this freedom finally in natural and social categories, while Buddhists and Hindus insist upon a final transcendence of the finite and historical as such. Christianity, with its insistence on indefinite possibilities for transcending natural and social structures on the one hand, and on the continuing creatureliness of man and the perils of false transcendence on the other, thus stands in complex supplementary and complementary relations to other positions on this matter. Christians share with most naturalists a suspicion of all attempts to minimize the significance of the natural and social foundations and limitations of human nature; but they share with Buddhists, Hindus, and Taoists a suspicion of all attempts to limit human fulfillment to the natural and social spheres.

With reference to the basic "goodness" or "badness" of human nature as such, there appears to be a more definite contrast between

Christianity and other views. Western naturalism claims to be neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the possibilities of human nature in general, but maintains that the course of wisdom lies in finding and dealing with capacities which men have actually exhibited. While some schools of Confucianism have emphasized the basic goodness of man, Confucianism in general would also base its views of human nature on "common sense" and historical findings. Buddhism moves from a provisional pessimism in its analysis of the world as *dukkha* to an ultimate optimism regarding the possibility of self-salvation, and a similar confidence in the ability of men to deliver themselves from temporal futility is found in Hinduism. *In all traditions but Christianity it is ultimately man who saves himself.* Of course, various Hindu and Buddhist sects emphasize the role of saviors, but, in most instances, the chief work of the savior is either to inspire by example or miraculously to transform the finite and evil into the infinite and good. Or, where the savior is a source of grace in a quasi-Christian sense, as in Amida Buddhism, he is still only one incarnation of a timeless Buddhahood which may be realized in other ways. In general, it seems that there is no clear parallel for the Christian doctrine of original sin in any of the other traditions. Either man is believed to be capable of self-salvation through appropriate spiritual conduct, as in Hinduism and Buddhism, or he is believed capable of achieving the highest good through rationally regulated conduct, as in Confucianism and Western naturalism. The notion that man's best is not good enough seems to be uniquely expressed in Christianity.

THE CRUCIAL CHRISTIAN WITNESS

It seems to the writer, however, that the distinctive Christian view of man as related to other views is subsidiary to a more basic difference between Christianity and other traditions. Underlying all points of difference between Christianity and other schools East and West is the Christian philosophy of history. We have noted that, in the East-West debate on philosophical method, the Buddhists and Hindus argue for a methodology capable of leading to a "highest knowledge" in which the distinction between time and eternity, the finite and the infinite, is overcome. Neo-Confucianists and Western naturalists, on the other hand, finally deny the possibility of such knowledge and, therefore, see inquiry in a different light. Both take time seriously and

admit only a temporal and therefore changing result of inquiry. Again, we noted that, in the discussions of metaphysics, modern Hindus and Buddhists seek to emphasize the significance of the temporal world—yet that world is always understood to be ultimately dependent and instrumental, *māyā* and *dukkha*. Naturalists East and West, on the other hand, include space and time among the metaphysically ultimate categories, even though they are willing to speak of "eternal" values in a poetic sense as those values which may be pan-temporally enduring.

Finally, in ethics and social philosophy, we find contemporary Buddhists and Hindus manifesting a concern for human need in all its forms—yet the final goal remains transcendence of all earthly values, and social service is motivated by personal desire for that merit which makes such transcendence possible. The overall effect of the doctrine of *karma* has not, historically, led to social ferment. Naturalists, East and West, on the other hand, base their ethical and social systems on temporal and natural values socially achieved or achievable and are skeptical of the social effects of any form of ethical transcendentalism. *Now, in each instance, Christianity differs because it takes time more seriously than the absolutists without giving it the position of ultimacy accorded by the naturalists.* It affirms a transtemporal reference for religious inquiry but denies that the distinction between the temporal and the eternal can be overcome in time, in any form of experience. It affirms the dependence of the finite on the infinite in metaphysics, but declares that the finite realm is essentially good and the locus of knowledge of the infinite. It affirms that human fulfilment lies ultimately "beyond history," but asserts that such fulfilment is possible in history only in principle and not in fact, and that false claims of ethical transcendence in history by institutions or individuals are productive of grave social evil. The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, with its overtones of judgment and redemption, though it remains foolishness to some and a stumbling-block to others, points to a view of the relation of time to eternity, of historical striving to eternal life, which is the substance of Christianity's crucial witness.

In developing and applying the Christian philosophy of history, then, Christian thinkers will be performing their most necessary, distinctive, and useful role in meetings of East and West. In the stresses of our times, multitudes East and West are turning to the concrete promises of a dialectical materialism which hopes for a historical re-

demption of history. Others, West and East, are despairing of historical salvation and turning to various other-worldly panaceas. Within each of the major traditions represented in the East-West Philosophers' Conference there are more vital indigenous correctives for these extreme alternatives than is frequently supposed, and Christianity can make its witness effective only if it engages humbly in the common task of reconception. It may well be that if a "world faith" ever emerges—and it is by no means clear that such an emergent is desirable —it will seem to each of the major traditions to have sprung principally from itself. In any event, it is the task of the Christian thinker carefully to define and humbly to bear witness to his faith as related to others. He may thus speak the truth in love, and in the conviction that his is a significant role in the meeting of East and West.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ancient Egyptian Religion, An Interpretation. By Henri Frankfort. New York; Columbia University Press, 1948. x, 172 pp. 31 illustrations and Frontispiece. $3.00.

The subject of this book is difficult, perhaps the most difficult topic in the field of ancient religion. That it has here been made easy of access is due to the author's concentration on the central themes of Egyptian religion and to his dispensing with masses of material, a discussion of which would have obscured the outline of fundamentals. In the Preface, Professor Frankfort sets down his conviction that books on Egyptian religion have either been so much concerned with the organized presentation of vast amounts of material that the interpretation of essential meanings was lost sight of, or, when such interpretation was undertaken, it was warped by too strong a bias or too little imaginative understanding of religious phenomena. With this general contention, which does not imply a belittling of past achievements, this reviewer is in substantial agreement. Previous works on Egyptian religion have been of a pioneering kind. Egyptologists, chiefly of the past generation, have presented massive critical studies encompassing the whole, or devoted to important sections of Egyptian religion. In this country, J. H. Breasted's *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* opened the field to a larger public while contributing a distinctive and original approach. In addition, numerous handbooks have done their usual job of simplification and popularization.

Frankfort's book focuses on the essence of Egyptian religiosity. The author deliberately omits discussion of historical developments in order to disengage the unchanging basic features. He traces Egyptian religious beliefs and concerns in the various spheres of life; for religion was not relegated to a special plane of the *sacrum* against which there extended the wide range of the secular. Such typically modern division was unknown. The radiation of a specifically Egyptian religious attitude into the various facets of human endeavor is shown through the consecutive discussion of five major themes: The gods of Egypt; the state and its ruler; the ethics of daily life; the concept of immortality; and the basic attitude toward life as mirrored in literature and art.

The author's cardinal tenet is that Egyptian religious beliefs lose

their, to us, bewildering incongruity, if we understand that the Egyptian approached and understood one and the same phenomenon in a number of ways which, to him, were complementary rather than incongruous. For, in the imaginative reasoning of the prelogical mind, confrontation with the powers in nature resulted in a variety of beliefs, each valid in the context of a particular experience, all held simultaneously, and retained even when combined into larger systems of theological speculation. This basic outlook, to which Frankfort has given the name "multiplicity of approaches," has been treated more fully in his *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago, 1948) and in *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (Chicago 1946), the collaborative effort of several scholars, in which the prelogical "mythopoeic" mind of the peoples of the ancient Near East has received most distinguished elucidation.

The book's first chapter is devoted to a discussion of Egyptian polytheism and to the problem of animal worship, a feature of Egyptian religion which is as notorious as it is difficult of understanding. As to the great cosmic gods, they stand out, not as different in essence from the multitude of minor deities, but as "centers around which speculative thought crystallized." Here we encounter examples of multiple imagery, as when the sun is viewed as the self-created creator of the world but is also called the son of the sky-goddess. To this "multiplicity of approaches," which arose when one natural phenomenon evoked several responses, the author finds a complementary mode of thought, termed "multiplicity of answers," which comes into play when a single problem occupying the mind is related to several cosmic phenomena, as when, for example, the creation of the world was attributed to a number of different gods and imagined in a variety of ways.

Another important concept introduced here is that of the immanence of the Egyptian gods, who "seem captives within their own manifestations" and "remain incomplete as personages."

Carrying the analysis into the political sphere, Professor Frankfort treats the central political doctrine, that of the divinity of the pharaoh, who, as the champion of justice, upheld the social order, just as the gods maintained the order of the cosmos through their allegiance to truth and justice, personified in the goddess Maat. The emphasis on order, considered society's greatest value, is embedded in the conviction

that the universe is static. The author sees in the concept of a static universe the Egyptian's basic attitude to life which informed all his endeavors and integrated the multitude of his beliefs. It underlies the ethics of daily life, as they find literary expression in the "Teachings" of the wise men. In a changeless universe, the good life is one that embodies order, harmony, and the greatest possible permanence. And when this order of society was disrupted by political upheavals (comparatively rare in Egyptian history), it left the Egyptian "totally disorientated."

Where stability and permanence were supreme values, death presented a problem of the first magnitude. Though viewed as an interruption, not as the end, of life, it aroused extreme anxiety and the most baffled speculation. In this chapter ("The Egyptian Hope") the author describes how the preoccupation with survival of the body as well as with the journey into the beyond and the life to be led there produced a multitude of beliefs, images, and practices, each designed to cope with a particular situation. An especially interesting point here is the discussion of the elusive "Field of Rushes," that haven of safety in the perilous beyond.

Finally, the emphasis on permanence is seen to have left its mark on literature and art. In particular, Egyptian poetry is revealed as being basically anti-narrative. It tells no story and conveys no information. When historical events were to be recorded, it was done in the driest of prose; for "the incidents of history, like all singular and isolated events, lacked real significance." What inspired the poet was contemplation of unchanging truths and conveyance of a single mood. And what mattered in poetic expression was the richness of the imagery with which this vision was rendered. This chapter is all the more welcome since Egyptian literature has, as yet, received a very small share of critical investigation; and there are several fine points here that might be further explored.

Beautifully written and engagingly illustrated, this original and distinguished study will hold the attention of scholars and laymen for a long time to come.

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The Philosophy of Anaxagoras. An Attempt at Reconstruction. By Felix M. Cleve. New York: King's Crown Press, 1949. xi, 167 pp. $3.00.

Many years have passed since Cleve published his first reconstruction of Anaxagoras' system, yet the problems connected with the exegesis of the difficult fragments have never lost their fascination for him. The present book is the outcome of a long struggle for a better understanding of these fragments. It is written with enviable courage and confidence. In fact, Cleve is so convinced of the validity of his own approach that he has considered it unnecessary to pay attention to the efforts of others who, in the last twenty or thirty years, have come forward with reconstructions. He seems almost surprised to find that he is not alone in holding that "the constructions of most of his predecessors were frequently understood too subjectively by Aristotle" (p. 121).

In recent studies much energy has been devoted to clarifying the relationship between Anaxagoras' *homoiomereiai* and his "opposites." The former term designates a number of homogeneous (or supposedly homogeneous) substances like flesh, blood, bone, gold, possibly also, water, and earth; the latter covers qualities like warm and cold, dense and rare. It might be better to speak of warm matter, cold matter, etc.; Cleve's attempt (p. 148) to prove that τὸ θερμόν, in addition to meaning "warm stuff" may also mean "warmth," is unconvincing and rests on arbitrary inference from the usage of later writers.

Anyone who consults Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* (pp. 262 ff.) or reads Cornford's important article on Anaxagoras (*Class. Quart.* 24 [1930], 14 ff., 83 ff.) will learn that Anaxagoras' famous statement, "A portion of everything is in everything," has been variously interpreted, and that there is much to be said for referring the former "everything" to the opposites which are—in different mixtures—present in the homogeneous substances. Hardly anyone would deny today that the opposites had a very important place in Anaxagoras' physical system. Cleve, however, goes farther than others have dared to go; he believes that the opposites are actually Anaxagoras' "elements" and that even his "seeds" (*spérmata*) are not particles of flesh, bone, gold, and other substances of the kind, but particles of the opposite qualities, warm, cold, rare, dense, etc.

Is it possible to construct Anaxagoras' system on the basis of this hypothesis? If the elements are the bright and dark, moist and dry, hot

and cold, and other pairs of opposites, then flesh, bone, and blood must come into existence by a mixture or aggregation of these elements. Yet the salient point of Anaxagoras' physics seems to have been that bones and other uniform substances do not come into being but are always there. They exist in the food before they exist in the body. It is true that this view of Anaxagoras' system derives much of its support from the statements of doxographers and other authors, like Aristotle, Lucretius, and Simplicius. Cleve's methodological principle is to rely as little as possible on "reports" and to make the most of the actual fragments. Here he carries a good principle to extreme and impossible lengths, for the unanimity of the witnesses cannot be ignored; such detailed accounts as we read in Lucretius (1.834 ff.) cannot be explained away. Simplicius had the actual book of Anaxagoras before him and did not blindly repeat Aristotle's words. Moreover, fragment 10, "How can hair come into being out of what is not hair, or flesh out of what is not flesh?" is in accord with the "reports." This fragment was discovered by H. Diels, who incorporated it in his collection. On no reasonable grounds is it open to suspicion, and Cleve's attempt to throw doubt on its genuineness because it does not fit into his construction looks suspiciously like special pleading. A further stumbling block for Cleve's theory is the word "seeds" (*spérmata*) as used, for instance, in fragm. 4 (2.35.1 Diels-Kranz). As the opposites have already been mentioned in the same sentence, it is unlikely that the words "and an infinite multitude of seeds" should refer to them once more.

Cleve is undoubtedly correct in thinking that Anaxagoras explained the formation of things by "aggregation" and that he had a "terminology of aggregation." Yet, what are we to regard as the enduring stuff involved in all aggregation? And what will not dissolve when the aggregation is decomposed? As Cleve believes that the opposites are the indestructible and infinitely divisible ultimate, he finds it possible to build up the uniform substances (flesh, bone, etc.) out of "molecules" for which he coins a Greek word (*méreia*). If Anaxagoras' principle of infinite divisibility applies to the uniform substance—if he taught *neque corporibus finem esse secandis* (Lucr.1.844)—the molecular theory violates the fundamental idea of his system.

Anaxagoras' *Nous*, his Mind principle, is likewise presented in a new light. According to Cleve, "every molecule is flowed around by Nous on all sides" (p. 37). We have already pointed out that the molecular

structure of the homogeneous substances is a hypothesis which conflicts with the principle of infinite divisibility. *Nous* is the "thinnest of things," and there are entities "in which *Nous* is present," yet the notion of a flowing *Nous* would need better support than this to become acceptable.

We know that Plato and Aristotle blamed Anaxagoras for making insufficient use of his *Nous* principle. As reconstructed by Cleve, Anaxagoras' system would not be open to this criticism. As a matter of fact, the rotatory movements of the heavenly bodies and of ether and air are explicitly attributed to the agency of *Nous* in some of our fragments, and Cleve appears to me to complicate the picture unnecessarily by introducing "automotions" of the elements and other concepts of Aristotelian or even later provenience. On the other hand, there is no warrant for thinking that *Nous* operates in the processes of nutrition, digestion, and sensation.

The problems posed by the fragmentary evidence remain tantalizing. The temptation to fill out the gaps by speculation has proved too strong for many whose linguistic and philological equipment was better than Cleve's. Yet, without daring hypotheses no advance will be made.

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The Book of Books: An Introduction. By SOLOMON GOLDMAN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. xiii, 459 pp. $3.75.

This is the first in a projected series of thirteen volumes, to be written by Dr. Goldman, which are to deal with the Hebrew Bible. The series as a whole is entitled "The Book of Human Destiny." The present volume is intended to serve as a general introduction both to the Bible itself and also to the remaining volumes of the series, in which Dr. Goldman will deal individually and separately with each of the thirty-nine books of the Hebrew Canon.

Textual and historical problems will not be neglected, but such questions as Moses' part in the composition of the Pentateuch or David's in that of the Psalms will not be held to be of equal importance with the ideas attributed to the Lawgiver or the royal singer or the manner in which they were set down or the influence they have exerted.

Altogether it is an ambitious task which the author has set himself in the contemplated series.

The present volume seems to this reviewer to be of rather uneven value. The first chapter deals principally with those qualities of the Hebrew language which have made it a fit instrument for the communication of biblical ideas, and which, even in translation, have made their influence felt on other languages. This section is interesting and enlightening, although it does not provide the general reader with any more information on the subject than he could get from Professor Pfeiffer's *Introduction to the Old Testament* (New York, 1941). Furthermore, the chapter is marred by the fact that Dr. Goldman feels it necessary to defend the Bible against charges that it is narrowly Jewish in its spirit and theme. "Never has greatness been more shamefully traduced," declaims the author, "never has criticism more clearly betrayed the baseness of the critic, than in the libel, offered by 'objective' commentators, that the spirit of the Hebrew Bible is chauvinistic." Dr. Goldman does not give us the names of these commentators nor the titles of the books in which their criticisms appear. There may be such critics around, but in the present context they look more like straw men, set up for Dr. Goldman's own convenience; and his eloquent defence of the universal spirit of the Hebrew Bible which follows seems about as necessary as a politician's defence of prosperity and American motherhood. In other words, this reviewer feels that Dr. Goldman would have done better to have taken the universalism of the Bible for granted and not to have bothered himself or us about these base but unnamed critics.

The second chapter of Dr. Goldman's book is entitled "Graven Images" and deals with the artistic genius of the Jews. His analysis of why the Jews "sacrified part of the enjoyment of the plastic arts" is good, as is his observation that the artistic "medium which the ancient Jew found least confining was language, and this he employed with signal and unexampled skill."

Chapter III, "The Hebrew Canon," gives a straightforward account of that subject, and does not seem to call for comment. Chapter IV, "Biblical Criticism," offers a brief but good history of the various stages in biblical criticism through the Graf-Wellhausen theory and down to the present day. Its chief merit, however, lies in its discussion of early rabbinic criticism of the Bible, a subject about which little is generally

known, but which is of real interest and importance to the general history of criticism.

The fifth chapter, "The Dawn of Conscience," takes its heading, in ironic tone, from James H. Breasted's book of the same title. It is a chapter which this reviewer finds some embarrassment in commenting upon, and which he wishes Dr. Goldman had not written. Its main theme, briefly, is that much of modern biblical criticism and modern archeology have been motivated by prejudices and presuppositions hostile to the Jews and to Judaism. Here, for example, are a few quotations which illustrate both the theme of the chapter and the mood in which that theme is presented: "The main interest of a goodly number of critics," says Dr. Goldman, "has been to establish the inferiority of the Hebrew Bible to the ethics and religion of the Gospels and Epistles" (p. 69). Or again, he says:

> Two more evils of which Biblical Criticism has suffered, and which have hampered its progress no little, were the direct result of its exclusively German domination in the century between Eichhorn and Wellhausen. One has been the proclivity of so many Germans to attempt to fit everything in heaven and on earth into some kind of airtight system; the other, their deep-seated prejudice against the Jewish people (p. 71).

Dr. Goldman repeats with approval the statement that "Hegel begat Vatke, Vatke begat Wellhausen, and Wellhausen begat Delitzsch," and then goes on to say, "It may now be added that Delitzsch begat *Die Grosse Tauschung, Die Grosse Tauschung* begat *Fort mit dem Alten Testament,* and that all of them together had no little share in the composition of *Mein Kampf*" (p. 72). Or again, Dr. Goldman quotes Professor Breasted as saying, "The subsequent history of the Hebrews would not lead us to suspect that they have been indifferent to financial power or business success," and then comments on this statement as follows:

> Assuming that this is so, what particular contribution does it make to our understanding of the Egyptians? Is not this the kind of half-truth that we have learned to expect in the insolent pamphlets of Jew-baiters? And where, may we ask, but in the writings of anti-Semites could he have found support for his observation? . . . Had he written his book, as he assures us, without the slightest anti-Semitic bias, he would not have carelessly lent the prestige of his great name to a falsehood which the Nazi minister of propa-

ganda was at that very moment exerting every effort to make the world accept as unimpeachable truth (p. 75).

These statements and others like them are most unfortunate. Whether true or not, they are written in bitterness, and hence are inappropriate to the book as a whole. That there is just cause in our world of the twentieth century for Dr. Goldman's bitterness may be admitted, but that fact only heightens the sense of sadness which one feels as one reads this chapter, a sadness born of the realization that all of us are in one way and another responsible for the bitterness which Dr. Goldman expresses.

The last section, "Echoes and Allusions," is almost as large as all the other chapters put together and is perhaps the most valuable feature of the book. In it Dr. Goldman has gathered together about a thousand quotations from 429 authors who have commented on or alluded to the Bible. This whole section is carefully indexed so that one may quickly find what was said about the Bible by Goethe, Lincoln, Dostoevsky, Shakespeare, and many others.

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Coniectanea Neotestamentica, XI. In honorem Antonii Fridrichsen Sexagenarii. Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1948. xx, 252 pp.

This beautifully printed *Festschrift* in honor of Professor Fridrichsen, of Uppsala, was prepared by members of his famous New Testament Seminar—one of the most productive seminars in the theological world. The "epistle dedicatory" is written, in French, in their name by Bo Reicke; the contributors are mainly foreign scholars—only three are Scandinavian, and these were especially chosen by Dr. Fridrichsen. The twenty-one articles cover a wide range of New Testament study: three are on text, three on lexicography, six on exegesis, two on history of religions, six on literary criticism, two on New Testament theology —though two or three of the essays might be counted in more than one classification. All are representative of the best in modern New Testament scholarship.

1. *Text:* Albert Debrunner discusses (p. 33) various readings in the Chester Beatty papyri, especially in P^{46} and shows that these read-

ings have every right to serious consideration—a view that will be welcomed by the revisers of the new Revised Standard Version of the New Testament, who took these papyri into careful consideration at every step.

Jean Hering writes on Mark 7:37, *kalôs panta pepoiêken* (p. 91). He finds the clue to Mark's difficult reading in the parallel text of Matthew—this is not the only passage where Matthew has preserved something that the present text of Mark lacks! Read *kullous panteleis pepoiêken.*

Bo Reicke deals with the two fragments of I Tim. numbered 061 (p. 196), and prints them, photographically, full-size. He concludes with Th. Zahn that they belong to the fourth to sixth centuries, that they belonged to the same MS, and that their resemblance to the Latin tradition may be explained by derivation from an early bilingual MS. As for provenance—who knows? They came to France from Egypt: this is all we can say.

2. *Lexicography:* Wilhelm Michaelis deals with the origin of the Johannine title, "Paraclete" (p. 147). In spite of a certain resemblance with the corresponding Mandaean term, there can be no real connection between them (cf. Nils Johannson's view, in *Paraklêtoi,* 1940, p. 285). More probably, the author of the Fourth Gospel chose the term for his conception of the Holy Spirit, and so inaugurated its use in Christian literature.

Arthur D. Nock writes on "Word-Coinage in the Hermetic Writings" (p. 163), a useful appendix to his recent edition of Hermetica (jointly with A. J. Festugière, 1946). It is surprising how many new words are found in these tractates—though of course no lexicon covers the whole of spoken or written koinê Greek, but only the literature that has survived. (Professor W. H. Davis, of Louisville, has shown me an extensive list of papyrus words and forms not found even in the new Liddell and Scott!) The creative urge to form new words is seen in Plato, and may perhaps be expected in all vital religious and philosophical writings (vide our present-day philosophers, e.g., Whitehead); but this was deliberate, and something may be learned from "the influence of grammatical and rhetorical theory on popular writing under the Empire."

Harald Riesenfeld discusses the meaning of the verb *arneisthai* (p. 207). The primary meaning was undoubtedly "to deny," but an equally

good Greek meaning was "not wanting to know of"—and in between the two lay several possible shades of meaning. The bearing of this on New Testament interpretation and translation is obvious.

3. *Exegesis:* Rudolf Bultmann writes of credal and hymnic fragments in I Peter (p. 1), and proposes the theory that an early creed underlies 1:20 + 3:18 f., 22, beginning with "I believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was destined before the foundation of the world . . . ." Certain passages in Ignatius, Polycarp, and the Odes of Solomon —as well as other New Testament passages—support the hypothesis. The essay deserves consideration along with the recent studies by Oscar Cullmann, and the important chapter on the creed in Hans Lietzmann's *Church History*. The Creed was no late development in early Christian church life, as Professor Bultmann has shown in his new *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Lfg. 1, 1948).

Lucien Cerfaux deals with the parabolic literary theme in the gospel of John (p. 15), and concludes that John carried forward the Synoptic (i.e., Marcan) view of the parable as designed both to hide and to reveal the truth—a theory derived from the Old Testament and elaborated in apocalyptic. The *paroimia* is "a mysterious or symbolic saying, a mode of revelation proper to the temporal mission of Christ." The famous *egô eimi* of the Johannine Christ sometimes introduces the explanation of a parable, and is not always the direct announcement of a revelation.

Oscar Cullmann discusses the phrase *ho opisô mou erchomenos* (p. 26). The saying in which it occurs was perhaps designed to offset the fact that, chronologically, Jesus followed John. Essentially, Christ was *before* John, and all others. Hence the Baptist is led to testify that the one who is to follow him is "preferred before him" (cf. John 10:8).

T. W. Manson deals with Mark 2:27 f. (p. 138), and proposes to read, "The Sabbath was made for *the Son of* Man, and not *the Son of* Man for the Sabbath." There are one or two other passages in Mark where a similar proposal might be made (e.g., 8:36 f, perhaps originally a Marcan echo of the Temptation narrative in Q).

Ethelbert Stauffer proposes (p. 237) a brilliant new explanation of the mysterious apocalyptic number "666." Taking the abbreviations used on Roman coins, one may add up their values thus:

A(utokratôr)	=	1
KAI(sar)	=	31

DOMET(ianos) = 419
SEB(astos) = 207
GE(rmanikos) = 8

666

Johannes de Zwaan has an essay on "Hermeneutical Plus-Value" (p. 242). It is a warning against the western habit of oversharp definition, of rigid scholastic equation of certain specific ideas with certain specific terms. The warning is especially needed in exegesis and biblical theology, since biblical thought "does not tend to the static, but to the dramatic aspect. It is focused on the dynamic aspects of reality." It is not interested in analysis or definition, but "seems to be essentially of a descriptive character."

4. *History of Religions:* A. J. Festugière writes on Plato's *Epinomis* and the introduction of foreign cults at Athens (p. 66). The writing is authentically Platonic. The author knows what he is doing. He is endeavoring to introduce the astral cult, not as a private cult but as the worship of the true gods of Athens, in lieu of the Olympians!

Joachim Jeremias writes of the meeting of Jesus with a Pharisaic high priest in the temple area (Pap. Oxy., v. 840), and defends it as an authentic gospel tradition: Jesus' rejection of the Pharisaic regulations governing lustral purifications—the true baptism is not with water.

5. *Literary Criticism:* One of the late Martin Dibelius' last writings was the essay on the Conversion of Cornelius (p. 50). In the original form of the story, Cornelius rather than Peter was the leading character. Like the story of the Ethiopian in chapter 8, this innocent tale came to be elaborated and was fitted into the schematic development of Acts. There must have been other stories of conversion—of "God-fearers" and others drawn to the Christian movement—without each and every one of them leading concretely and decisively or immediately to baptism.

W. G. Kümmel's paper on "Mythische Rede und Heilsgeschehen" in the New Testament (p. 109)—the words are too strongly charged with controversy to translate!—is largely an attempt to refute Professor Bultmann's proposed *Entmythologisierung* of the New Testament. To those of us who follow the controversy from a distance, it must seem that the first thing to do is define "myth," and next to identify the "myths" in the New Testament which it is proposed to eliminate. On a strict

definition, there can be little that deserves the name in the New Testament—some passages in the Apocalypse, for example. On a broader definition (not to say a looser one, like Strauss's), far more will be included—even incidents in the evangelic history that have seemed most historical, but which were related only because of their meaning, their significance for faith, i.e., for salvation (see Professor C. H. Dodd's *History and the Gospel*, 1938). Professor Kümmel is concerned with the threat to *Heilsgeschichte* which this "demythicizing" involves. The test must be, not the critical judgment of modern man, but what is essential to the central *kerygma* of the New Testament. On this basis, such a "myth," e.g., as Christ's descent to Hades is proved to be late and unessential.

Albrecht Oepke deals (p. 179) with a hitherto unnoticed citation from the fifth Book of Ezra (= IV Ezra 1-2). The citation is in the Augustinian *Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae* (ed. Maur., [Venice 1729], VIII, App. 21:E), "quid tibi faciam, Jacob?" etc. See IV (= V) Ezra 1:24. The author also discusses the role of anti-synagogal (*not* "anti-semitic") polemic in the New Testament (pp. 188 ff.)—a matter that concerns New Testament theology as well as literary criticism.

Johannes Schneider deals with the composition of John 10 (p. 220), and proposes the view that verses 27-30 originally followed 1-18, but got separated from the meditation on the main theme which centers in the words "door," "shepherd," and "sheep." Then, as elsewhere in John, the section 27-30 thus severed off got joined to a new sequence of ideas. The "laws of composition" governing John's work need further study.

C. Spicq, writing (p. 226) on the authenticity of Hebrews 13, concludes that it is not only by the same hand as the rest of the epistle, but is an essential part of the epistle. The same "great spirit" who elaborated the doctrinal part here deals with practical duties.

4. *Theology*: Professor Maurice Goguel contributes a major article (p. 75) on the Protestant conception of the authority of the New Testament. After tracing the various stages or types of authority reflected in the New Testament itself, he considers the criteria of a doctrine of authority valid for Protestants. Whereas for Rome, the tradition is living and growing, while scripture is unchanging and immobile, for Protestants the subordination of the Word of God for the Ecclesia, as authority, must not harden into a dogma—with certain early stages of

development, found in the New Testament, crystallized and immobile. The new conception must take full account of historical research.

Gösta Lindeskog writes on the veil of the temple (p. 132), and finds the story to be an early cultic symbol of the meaning of Christ's death —an interpretation destined to be far more fully elaborated in the Epistle to Hebrews.

All in all, the volume is a noble tribute to a great teacher. Long may he be spared to "raise up" even more "disciples," and to spread not only his great enthusiasm for New Testament studies but also the lustre of his learning to the far corners of the earth!

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John Hales of Eton. By JAMES HINSDALE ELSON. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. 199 pp. $2.50.

A renewed interest in the seventeenth century is evidenced by the increased quantity and often fine quality of a growing stream of books and articles. This is especially true in the area of English developments during the "century of genius." While the so-called Anglican men of latitude have received their share of attention, especially in those works dealing with the problem of toleration, one of their number, John Hales of Eton, has been strangely neglected. To be sure he has received consideration in the recent studies of W. K. Jordan, William Haller, and Robert M. Krapp. But no modern thorough examination of his life, work, and relation to his age has ever before been published. This is peculiar, indeed, since John Hales was referred to as "ever-memorable" by his own generation and, in the early eighteenth century, was saluted as "one of the greatest genius's that ever England produc'd."

This study was pursued that a searching investigation of the thought and ideas of Hales might proffer additional insights into the problems and interests of his age. Though no really new biographical information was uncovered, the author has succeeded in relating Hales to the intellectual and religious currents of his day and thus has painted a clearer picture of the man and his thoughts.

John Hales was a famous classical scholar as well as a divine of the Church of England, but in spite of an overwhelming love for Greek

and all subjects classical, a predisposition to religious problems outweighed all other concerns. Hales was not the kind of man to carry on the examination and discussion of religious problems in the public forum. Somewhat of a recluse by nature, and having reached a position of mild skepticism, he could not enter heartily into a public debate on matters religious. Living through the first half of the seventeenth century, he was part of one of the most turbulent yet fruitful eras of modern history. Here one confronts a figure thoroughly immersed in certain contemporary intellectual currents yet somewhat aloof from such a key movement as Puritanism.

Mr. Elson has accurately described Hales as a figure half-way between a type of seventeenth century humanism and eighteenth century rationalism. There is a line of thought which leads through Hales and the men of latitude to Archbishop Tillotson, William Tindal, and Bishop Hoadley. The position of Hales might be characterized as that of a rationalistic supernaturalist. Reason and unambiguous plain passages in scripture were sufficient for an individual to achieve salvation. Both were necessary, and the two were sufficient. But due to ambiguous passages in scripture, lack of adequate critical scholarly preparation, and man's tendency to dogmatize, Hales noted that truth was not easily arrived at or quickly captured in creeds or confessions. Thus he exhibited a mild skepticism toward all definite formulations of faith, and emphasized the primacy of personal judgement responsible to God's clear revelations in the plain places of scripture and to man's reason implanted by God and faithfully trained by man.

In addition to his position between humanism and rationalism, Hales is noted for his place in the development of toleration. One of the most valuable contributions of the author is his evaluation of John Hales's concept of toleration. Though very short, one of Hales's most important tracts is *The Tract Concerting Schism and Schismatics,* written in 1636. It was originally written to William Chillingworth and had great influence upon him; also, it was important as a rebuttal weapon in the hands of the Dissenters after the Restoration. Taken in conjunction with totality of Hales's works, it represents a movement in the direction of toleration quite different from the various Puritan formulations of that problem. Unlike Puritans such as Milton and Goodwin, who advocated positive reform and a consequent toleration of individuals and even of sects outside the Church of England, Hales

avoided a commitment to a positive program of reform by advocating the established Church in such a comprehensive and broadened state that private judgement could be exercised so as to make unnecessary schism and sects. Thus the trend of thought advanced by John Hales, though differing in intent and goal from Puritan advocates of toleration, also contributed directly to the growing idea of toleration which finally dominated the later seventeenth century.

In spite of sympathetic penetration and thorough research, one important question about the career of John Hales remains unanswered. Archbishop Laud was displeased by the ideas expressed in the *Tract Concerning Schism and Schismatics,* and he called Hales to a conference to discuss the problem. Though the date of their meeting is uncertain, we do know that Laud gave Hales a canonry in 1639. The question remains why the gift was made to one expressing ideas hostile to Laud. Mr. Elson recognizes the attempt of Mr. Krapp (*Liberal Anglicanism,* 1944) to explain the gift as a reward for the help Hales supposedly gave Laud in writing the second edition of the *Conference with Fisher,* but he rejects this as unsatisfactory, in that it depends on the assumption of an early date for the conference. The dismissal of an early date appears to have been done too quickly, but more important, Mr. Elson did not examine thoroughly the internal evidence provided by Laud's treatise. With the exception of this small but important question, the book provides an adequate analysis of the life and ideas of John Hales as seen in the perspective of contemporary movements.

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Religious Trends in English Poetry. Vol. III (1780-1830): *Romantic Faith.* By Hoxie Neale Fairchild. New York, Columbia University Press, 1949. ix, 549 pp. $6.75.

In two earlier volumes, Professor Fairchild has explored the religious views and sentiments expressed in English poetry of the eighteenth century. These works, together with the present one, provide an excellent chronological study of the stream of religious thinking for nearly a century and a half. Volume III of *Religious Trends in English Po-*

etry, however, should attract many readers besides the specialists. It is not only an informative book, but a very readable one. In his separate treatment of each of the poets, Professor Fairchild has preserved much of the flavor of the traditional essay. His illustrations are well chosen, his prose is always clear, and his wit adds a pleasant sparkle to the text. In short, here is the fruit of scholarship with nothing of the rind.

The book deals with seven of the most eminent English poets—Burns, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats. Heretofore, we have had illuminating studies of their political opinions, their interest in medievalism, and their attitudes towards nature. But a satisfactory appraisal of their religious ideas has long been needed. This careful scrutiny of the subject is, therefore, a genuine contribution to scholarship, especially since a clear view of the religious beliefs of the Romantics is vital to an understanding of their lives and works.

The sea of faith had not begun to ebb so perceptibly in the early decades of the nineteenth century as it had by Arnold's day, but it was a stormy sea, churned by the winds of many doctrines. Deism had gone out of fashion, but numerous adherents of natural religion remained. Besides the great body of Methodists, the Evangelicals had sizeable groups within the Establishment and among the dissenting sects. Unitarianism was gaining, especially in intellectual circles. There was even a ripple of Swedenborgism. All of these movements had some effect upon one or another of the Romantics. Most of them, however, drew from these religious movements and from the doctrines of the Established Church only those beliefs that accorded with their own thinking at a particular stage of their development.

The chief thing that the poets had in common—if one will allow the paradox—was their individualism. All of them were vitally interested in religion, some were Christian, but none was orthodox. Each worshiped at a shrine where he served as priest and parishioner, and where, it sometimes seemed, the deity was fashioned after his own image and likeness. Burns, though a member of the Kirk, made Scotch Calvinism potable for himself by adding a sweet admixture of eighteenth century benevolism. Keats, though generally a skeptic, occasionally experienced intimations of a great beneficent spirit brooding over the world. Some of the poets, like Wordsworth, grew more orthodox with age, though even he apparently kept certain reservations to the end. The situation of Coleridge is even more interesting. Although he drank

from almost every philosophic font, his religion, like his poetry, was a distillation of his own. When he was a Unitarian, he was never the complete Unitarian, and when, at the end of his life, he became a defender of the Established Church, his prayer-book still faintly bore the inscription, *S.T.C.*

Professor Fairchild and certain other critics ascribe the highly personal quality of the Romantics' religious views to specific evolutionary developments of the two preceding centuries. "Protestantism, especially of the Puritan type, is the father of eighteenth-century sentimentalism which becomes romanticism on attaining maturity," says Professor Fairchild. Obviously, the transition from Puritanism to Romanticism was a complex process, made possible only because of the transforming atmosphere of eighteenth century benevolism, which caused the Puritan emphasis on salvation by faith to yield to current ideas of salvation by works and the natural goodness of man. By the time of the Romantics, little is left of the Puritan influence except the assertive denial of authority and the belief in the sufficiency of the individual to interpret the relationship between man and God. Thus the religion of the Romantics represented Protestantism carried to an extreme, but so changed that most of them worshiped a God who "exists for the purpose not of transforming a weak and sinful creature into a being worthy of salvation, but of authenticating the natural goodness of man and lending divine sanction to his expansive impulses."

Professor Fairchild's earlier work on the Romantic Movement, and on the religious trends in eighteenth century poetry, ideally fits him for the difficult task of describing the complex religious views of the Romantic writers. Having a sound understanding of Christianity, moreover, he never confuses sense and sensibility, piety and faith, religion and religiosity. On particular points, specialists will disagree with his interpretations, as is bound to happen when such controversial figures as the Romantics are under consideration. But there should be no disputing the true worth of this substantial volume. It should take its place among the first dozen critical books on the Romantic poets and will doubtless remain the best guide to their religious ideas for many decades.

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Traité d'histoire des religions. By MIRCEA ELIADE. Preface by GEORGES DUMÉZIL. Paris: Payot, 1949. 405 pp. 840 fr.

This new volume in Payot's *Bibliothèque scientifique* is the first part of an attempt at a new approach to the comparative study of religions. Faced with the problem of a *cours d'initiation* when he took up his duties some years ago as Professor of the History of Religion at the University of Bucharest, he attempted this new approach. It proved fruitful, so, as a refugee lecturer in Paris at the École des Hautes Études, he expanded his work during the academic sessions of 1946 and 1948, and in this first volume he presents his results to a wider audience.

In his *Avant-propos,* he quotes with approval the ironical query of Henri Poincaré, "Would a naturalist who has studied the elephant only under the microscope really have an adequate conception of that animal?" Too much of our study in the field of comparative religion has been concerned with delving into origins, or with providing, after minute microscopic examination, descriptions of this rite or that concept. Such study has its place. It is of some interest to know about traces of fossil elephants, and indications of where and when and under what circumstances the elephant appeared on our earthly scene. It is also of importance to know about the cellular structure of an elephant's bony parts and fleshy parts and glandular secretions. Yet, to know the elephant, one needs above all to see him as a living structure reacting to his natural environment.

Religion, wherever we find it, has a recognizable structure. It is concerned with human behavior in some social situation, and its structure is always adapted to that situation. We have some knowledge of how religious structures change along with changes in the socio-economic life of the groups practicing the religion. When a nomadic group changes from nomadism to settled life, forms of religious expression become possible which had not been possible in the wandering life, and other forms of expression which had had significance for nomads come to lose their significance. Objects of worship important at one stage of the life of a group may become relatively unimportant at another stage which brings to the fore quite other objects of worship. In this there is nothing to the discredit of religion. Religion is practiced by any people because it produces or preserves values which they consider desirable. Where it will need to function so as to serve those

values will naturally vary as the socio-economic status of the people changes, so such changes in its structure are to be expected. The values with which religion is concerned, however, are very much the same, and the satisfactions found in religion curiously alike, whether we study it among backward tribes or in highly civilized communities. It is the structures of religion, rather than its essential qualities, that differ from area to area and from period to period.

Is there, then, a fruitful line of approach to the study of these religious structures as they function in the life of social groups? Dr. Eliade here explores that of what he calls the *morphologie du sacré*. The most characteristic mark of religion as it concerns behavior is that it is occupied with matters which it regards as sacred, matters set apart in a peculiar way from other matters which are profane, i.e., not sacred. What marks out the sacred from the profane is a hierophany. Something (or someone) has manifested itself (or himself) at a particular point, and this hierophany has made what may before have been non-sacred, what perhaps still is non-sacred for those who have not experienced the hierophany at that point, into something sacred and of religious value.

Hierophanies may be associated with persons or with things, though this distinction between the personal and the impersonal was not drawn so sharply by some peoples as we are accustomed to draw it. The thing that is most instructive is that, at places widely separated in space and at periods far removed in time, we find the same things associated with hierophanies, and the experiences in connection with them described in curiously similar language. Here then, for the moment at least, we can forget history and simply study the structure of those forms in which religion has expressed itself in connection with various types of hierophanies. This will be a study of the morphology of the sacred.

In the present volume, Dr. Eliade studies a particular group of hierophanies for which we happen to have an abundance of evidence, both from the records of ancient peoples and from the practices of present-day peoples, whether of developed or of relatively undeveloped cultures. Here he assembles and discusses the material relevant to hierophanies concerned with celestial phenomena, sun and moon, waters, stones, the earth, vegetation, space as a *sacrum*, time as a *sacrum*, which leads to a brief discussion of the function of myth in

connection with hierophanies, and of the structure of symbols such as are used to indicate hierophanies. The succeeding volume will take up the study of the articulations and functions of religious rites and ceremonies, which will expose the mechanism whereby man's reactions to the *sacra* are transformed into ritual activities.

If we use the word "popular" in the best sense of the word, then this is a popular exposition, for its intention is to introduce the student to a vast field of comparative studies. The author has covered an enormous range of literature in his investigations, and has set forth facts and suggested interpretations of them clearly and concisely, indicating, as he goes along, the sources to which interested students may turn for further investigation for themselves. The author's own field of special competence is that of the religions of India, and for dealing with the material in that field he has adequate philological preparation. This makes his book pleasant reading in comparison with so many modern books about Oriental religions where the linguistic equipment of the writers seems to be a minus quantity.

It may be that we shall have to wait for generations before it is possible to write a History of Religion in the way Georges Sarton is writing the History of Science, but such a book as this goes a long way towards helping the student to see the elephant as he functions naturally in his environment.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

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Christianity and Civilization. Part I. By EMIL BRUNNER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. 172 pp. $2.50.

The book contains the first part of the Gifford Lectures, delivered in 1947. Its purpose is to formulate the conviction that "only Christianity is capable of furnishing the basis of a civilization which can rightly be described as human." To validate this extravagant claim, Brunner describes the relation between Christianity and civilization in their different spheres, dealing with almost every problem of philosophy, theology, and cultural history, from the metaphysical problem of *Being, Truth, Time,* and *Meaning,* to *Man in the Universe, Personality and Humanity, Justice* (this chapter is a summary of Brunner's previous book, *Justice and the Social Order*), *Freedom,* and *Creativity.*

The reviewer shares with the author the uneasy feeling that Brun-

ner's resources are inadequate indeed, compared with the immensity of the task and its difficulty—if it is at all an "imperative" and "urgent" task to survey once more the whole course of European intellectual history "in seven league boots." One may doubt it; the more so as many able books have been published in recent years on the same topic, by men like Dawson, Baillie, Niebuhr, and Toynbee. If there were, as Brunner assumes, only the alternative between a scholarly but sterile specialization and a superficial but stimulating synthesis, one could, perhaps, agree with him that a synthesis has to be risked, but certainly not at "whatever the cost." It is to be regretted that a man of his reputation yielded to the alleged necessities of our time, which he supposes to be in need of an additional synthesis instead of intellectual discipline and spiritual restraint.

How little Brunner approaches his task by theological presuppositions is indicated by the first sentence, which refers to a word of Mr. Churchill about the necessity of preserving our "Christian civilization." More confident than the historian Toynbee, the theologian Brunner believes in the Christian character of Western civilization because he is satisfied with the undeniable fact that, in the course of some fifteen centuries, "something like a Christian civilization" has been created. "Western civilization is, according to Mr. Churchill's word, a Christian civilization, *whatever that may mean*" (my italics). It is true, Brunner admits, that if we understand the word Christianity in its full and original meaning as incorporated in the New Testament, Christians were always a minority in a non-Christian world. But instead of pausing at this crucial point, Brunner goes on to say that "it is just as a manifestation of the superhuman power and reality of Christian faith and of the New Testament message, that they are powerful factors within the cultural world, even where life has been only superficially touched by them, or where they are present in very diluted and impure manifestations." One wonders how a powerful factor can justify not only calling the whole world in which it is one factor among many others by its name, but also proclaiming this factor as the only one capable of creating a truly human civilization. Nobody will deny that Roman basilicas, Gothic cathedrals, European music, art, literature and philosophy are unthinkable without the Bible and the Church. One can also admit that even our modern social and political institu-

tions are indirectly informed by the Christian tradition; but this does not mean that the Christian faith, which is inseparable from its eschatological substance, ever was or is *the* "foundation" of Western civilization. Brunner too is aware of this difficulty on account of the disproportion between New Testament Christianity and civilization. But, since he is from the outset determined to give a synthesis in a "doctrine" of Christian civilization, he cannot help forgetting soon his own initial statement and consistently confounding Christendom and faith in Christ. This confusion enables him to speak of a Christian civilization and to apply Christian doctrines, like that of Creation, as "culture-transcendent presuppositions" to our Western civilization. Carrying through this task, Brunner's survey becomes in many ways interesting and informing, as is always the case when one follows the indirect impact of religious and moral ideas into the various spheres of secular culture. But there is nothing new and original in his rapid course through the history of certain ideas, except the apologetic purpose. If a student wants to be informed about the main stages of the relation between Christianity and civilization, Baillie's unpretentious essay is a more reliable guide, because it is not afflicted by the modern disease of synthetic productions.

Occasionally Brunner remarks that what Kierkegaard contributed to European thought was "nothing but original Christianity and the Christian understanding of truth." The same Kierkegaard said that formerly Christianity was foolishness and a stumbling block, while it has now become civilization. Unfortunately, in Brunner's book no trace is left of Kierkegaard's insight, also no trace of Overbeck's criticism of the questionable compound of a Christian civilization. It is as if the general concern with history and with the fate of our civilization outweighs, even for Christian theologians, the concern with the Christian faith which is taken for granted, and supposed to be a cultural foundation. But, if anything can be learned from the dissolution of our Christian medieval civilization, it is the fact that the Christian overtones, or undertones, of a cultural tradition cease to sound when the main note, which cannot be a mere tradition, disappears, as Brunner himself remarks with regard to the impotence of German idealism.

KARL LÖWITH

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On Human Freedom. By JOHN LAIRD. London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. 152 pp. $2.00.

This little book is the text of the Forwood Lectures, delivered in the University of Liverpool in 1945. Its publication two years ago was already posthumous, and, lacking special information, we must, I suppose, sadly assume it to be the last of Laird's work which we can look forward to seeing. His death deprived the Scottish universities (and what losses they have had in recent years—one thinks of A. A. Bowman and A. E. Taylor) of an eminent teacher, as well as of a cogent and resourceful thinker. Laird's philosophical bias carried him in a different direction from Bowman and Taylor, but he shared their bent towards theological speculation, and, like Taylor, he crowned his work with Gifford Lectures. *Theism and Cosmology,* delivered in 1939, and *Mind and Deity,* in 1940, represent, perhaps, Laird's maturest thinking, but they were preceded by an unusually long list of published books, stretching from *A Study of Realism,* in 1920, to the *Enquiry into Moral Notions,* in 1935. From among them I should choose *Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion* and *Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature* as outstanding. Less a system builder than an exponent, Laird strikes me as having devoted himself, primarily, to expounding the position and disposition of philosophical empiricism. He seems to have remained, throughout his career, predominantly under the influence of David Hume, for whom, indeed, he delighted to acknowledge "amongst the masters . . . a predilection." On his readers he is likely to have something of the effect of Hume's economical and wary argument. His analyses are sharp, and his style grew, as the years passed, increasingly spare and supple. One fancies something characteristically Scottish in his preference for the very level statement. "Rational self-control [I take this from the present volume] is presupposed in any man who is in his right mind; and most people at many times are in their right minds." And, again, how one can enjoy in these connections *(On Human Freedom)* the plain, blunt statements: "Natural license . . . connotes the absence of insurmountable obstacles," and "Set a thrush free from your strawberry nets and he will fly away." His students must have found him difficult to oppose.

This a small point, but I cannot find the title of this book well chosen. Perhaps Laird did not choose it. The preposition does not sufficiently curtail the adjective and noun. The promise is all of processions

and long perspectives, while the performance, and Laird pretends to no other, is with the concept only, and with how quickly it may be reduced to the maximum of what, in his view, we should be wise to mean by it. In the final chapter, Laird offers us some notes on theism. He devotes two pages to homage to Spinoza. He does urge us, without any pretence of impartiality, to find safety in a voluntaristic determinism from the risks of an admission to which he thinks he can otherwise drive us, of general chaos; but all the rest is nonchalantly though professionally analytical and detached. Volition, choice, autonomy, rational and non-rational, motive, desire, impulse, one after another, the members of this notoriously recalcitrant platoon are called up for inspection, to be ordered back after the once-over, with a nod or the appropriate chevron on the sleeve. It is done with exemplary discipline and dispatch, and we are back again, before we could have counted on it, in the shade. No one except Kant, perhaps, is much the worse, but on Kant's account I cannot forbear a little complaint. In this book, as so often previously, Laird seems to me to treat the critical position with summary injustice.

> An ethic which sets out from the analysis of duty [Laird was writing this in 1925] plainly runs upon psychology at every turn, for it can never be anyone's duty to perform that which he cannot perform, and if the best use of our lives is enjoined we must clearly have acquaintance with the possible uses of them. . . . The truth is that we commonly enjoy an immensely oversimplified psychological theory in dealing with those matters, because we think in terms of the knowledge of good and evil, upon the one hand, and of the "will" upon the other. If, however, we mean by the "will" some faculty of responding immediately and with complete accuracy to any intention, admonition, or principle, which is expressly understood, it is plain that only a small part of our actions pertain to the "will" in this restricted sense, and that, as well as knowledge, many other psychological factors enter, among which emotion and sentiment, to say nothing of habit, are among the more considerable.

Now, twenty-two years later, Laird takes his stand on the same ground as the champion of the psychologically broadened position. And this time he makes much shorter work of it. He comes up to his Goliath like a David, and the smooth, round stone from the brook is the notion of cause.

> "Who in the world ever thought that education, including self-education [and how inadequate, surely, is the parenthesis] was not a causal process?

> And if there be anything instinctive or innate in our factual knowledge, why should that be uncaused? Similarly of our knowledge of good and evil, of right and wrong. . . . So too of our volitions . . . our volitions . . . have the same background, in a continuous personal causal history, as the knowledge on which they draw."

That education, that the acquisition of knowledge, that our beliefs of right and wrong can be regarded, factually, and, after the necessary abstraction and detachment, as causal sequences, no one, I suppose, would want to deny. Nonetheless, it is not through a view of causal connections, unearthed in the interest of psychology, that one acquires one's knowledge; the efficacy of the right is not a causal efficacy; and, in so far as a man makes up his mind in respect of reason, reason, not cause, is the principle of his volition. Laird recognizes the plea.

> To say that a man is in his right mind is to say, among other things, that he is able to judge upon evidence, to decide in terms of logical standards. And similarly when he gives his mind to questions of right and wrong. . . . The orbit of logical evidence is not causal at all; and yet it is the orbit of responsible moral action.

He recognizes the plea, but instantly dismisses it.

> The answer . . . is twofold. Firstly, the relevance of the natural history of any process of thought to its logical validity is no proof at all that thoughts do not have a natural history. On the contrary, they have such a history, and it cannot be proved to be a cause-free history simply on the ground that such and such an inference, say, is valid no matter what its causes may have been. Secondly, although validity per se is not an agent or a cause, belief in validity may very well be a cause. The belief that what he is about to do is right may very well be the principal part-cause of a righteous man's action.

Well, as the porter said in Macbeth's castle, here's equivocation. If a man's movements up to a window cannot properly be regarded as part of what he sees through the window when he has reached it, they should not be regarded as instrumental to his decision, if what he then decides to do derives from the consideration of what he has seen. But this is not the place to push these issues further.

How much too seldom it is that philosophers will, by writing unprofessionally, and, as it were on holiday, give us a chance to perceive

the effects philosophising has had on their appreciation of things and persons. Neither Laird's "Philosophical Incursions into English Literature," nor his "Memoir of Samuel Alexander," included in *Philosophical and Literary Pieces, Samuel Alexander* (Macmillan, 1939) are, I believe, widely known. They are for the general reader, and they are both wholly delightful.

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Humanism as a Philosophy. By Corliss Lamont. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949. 368 pp. $3.75.

Dr. Lamont has written an excellent book on Humanism, showing its rootage not only in scientific method but in a naturalistic philosophy. He shows how it existed even in the days of the ancient Greeks, the Brahmans, the Confucians, and the Egyptians. Humanism is found also in the writings of Epicurus and Lucretius, Erasmus, Rousseau, Wordsworth, and even in Kant and Hegel in spite of their dualisms and idealisms. In the United States it has taken many forms but, on the whole, is moving toward that ideal expressed by Aldous Huxley, "Humanism is human control by human effort in accordance with human ideals."

The author analyzes scientific method, expounds the ethics of humanism, its social good and happiness, and the democracy which it implies. His book is an admirable exposition of the various phases of the humanist point of view, such as the humanist tradition, the humanist theory of the universe, its reliance on reason and science, its affirmation of life, humanism and democracy, and a humanist civilization. Humanism is based in naturalism; ours is a process-universe and we are process-creatures. Reality is permanent in the midst of change. There is no absolute. Everything is relative to everything else, including atoms and island-universes. And humans are continually changing. The human is always natural, but has developed certain traits called secondary behavior which do not exist in subhuman nature. These traits are what the dualist has called the supernatural, the mental, and the spiritual. Humanism, like naturalism, emerged from a mystical to a factual point of view. The world is full of life and full of death. Every living thing is accompanied by the falling off of its decaying cells, and the decaying and dead things furnish the fertile soil for fresh

growth. Death is not to be condemned any more than life. They are just obverse aspects of a common process.

The only objection to Corliss Lamont's exposition of humanism is his attitude toward a possible life after death. With our present knowledge of the sub-microscopic realm, it is not truly scientific to state dogmatically that we will not have a future life. Just because the visible, the audible, and the palpable which we call our bodies pass away, that is, cease to be perceptible, does not mean that the patterns which are our personalities, which have been established in the sub-microscopic realm, will cease to exist. Indeed, there is much evidence that the cosmic energies never cease to exist. They simply change their forms; that is what took place when we came into existence, and there is no reason to suppose that we have ceased to exist just because our macroscopic and even our microscopic structures have slipped back to the sub-microscopic level.

It is a mistake, in the light of modern science, to say that "there is no place else to go" (p. 22), that "the naturalistic interpretation makes any form of personal survival after death out of the question" (p. 43), that "there is no possibility that the human consciousness, with its memory and awareness of self-identity intact, can survive the shock and disintegration of death" (p. 101), that "it is beyond all comprehension how they could possibly outlast the dissolution of the living brain in which they originated and had their being," (p. 120), that "the monistic relation, then, between body and personality has the standing of a proven psychological law and makes untenable any theory of a worth-while personal survival after death" (p. 120). And these statements are hardly consistent with what the author says on other pages, where he states:

> It is also conceivable, though most improbable, that at some very distant day science will learn how to prolong indefinitely the life of human bodies, except in cases of serious accidents that injure or crush the physical organism beyond all possibility of repair. Then there would be immortality in its original sense of "not death"; for people would simply not die, and the fundamental partnership of body and personality would never come to an end (p. 131).
>
> "I deny the *inevitability* of this earth becoming uninhabitable at some distant date and of all the living creatures upon it being extinguished; living and dying, birth and death, are essential and correlative aspects of the same

evolutionary process. Life affirms itself *through* death, which was brought into existence *by* life and derives its entire significance *from* life" (p. 130).

If he is looking forward to a new type of civilization such as Russia idealises in her co-operative economy, why not also look forward to a possible sub-microscopic existence after what we call our death? And this is why these statements should be changed in future editions of the book. A true humanism must not negate the possibility of a future life. This recognition of the subatomic facts of our selfhood is the true basis of a humanistic philosophy.

Moreover, science has found that this matter in motion, though it is always changing from one to another of its multitudinous forms, is absolutely indestructible and eternal. This point is summed up in what is known as the Law of the Conservation of Energy or, to use alternate phrasing, the Law of the Indestructability of Matter (p. 153).

For the ancient Greek philosophers and the medieval theologians, the real was the immutable and the eternal; change was a mark of unreality, illusion, error, non-being. For modern science, change is the fundamental fact we confront in nature. An object is a dynamic process, not a static substance. A living organism is that center of a field of dynamic activities and potentialities which ramifies out into the surrounding universe in ways and to limits as yet unknown. But of one thing we may be reasonably sure, that, just as the actuality of the universe consists of its continuity of function in and through a constant change of structure, so the actuality of that organic-social whole we call a personality lies in the persistent functional pattern which survives all bodily changes. The fact that the field-center shifts from a visible to an invisible region of these dynamic activities is no ground for supposing that such a functional pattern has ceased to exist.

It is only beginning to be realized in all its implications that a sound theory of democracy, of moral freedom, and of immortality is bound up with a true understanding of the mutual relations of the individual and society. Along with the individuation there takes place a corresponding socialization of the self, and this, like everything else in nature, is an energic phenomenon. The so-called mental individuality of a self reflects the values of the social environment as the brain maps

the progressive elaboration of sensory and motor adjustments which take place on the periphery of the organism. Personality and consciousness are not so bound up with the individual organism that other persons cannot share in them, but constitute a social synthesis which indeed has no existence apart from the individual persons, yet expresses relationships which extend beyond this. Consciousness is the center of social osmosis, developed in the individual at the points of attrition with other individuals, through which the social values find their way from self to self. It is the very essence of selfhood to be passed on to others. Therein lies its immortality, paradoxical as the statement may seem. If I have identified myself with the lives and interests of others, then my self can never die, because it is being propagated endlessly in the social chain of individuals which does not exclude but incorporates me.

In spite of theological arguments from miracles, revelation, and from the nature of God, intuitional arguments from innate ideas, ethical arguments from the nature and needs of man, idealistic arguments from the alleged priority and superiority of the spiritual, psychophysical arguments based on the apparent control of mind over matter, and arguments of the physical scientist based on the indestructability of matter and the conservation of energy—in spite of all these arguments and others that might be mentioned, most persons find that their faith in a future life is a belief only, not a conviction. And why? Because the self for whose immortality they hope is an unreal abstraction. The trouble is not that they believe in immortality, but that they are ascribing it to an impossible self. The difficulty lies in the conception of personality. The self is conceived as a particularistic entity with barriers which keep it in inviolable isolation, independent of all outside influences, transcendent and self-sustaining. Its character is something sacred and incommunicable, something unique and unshareable, something often hostile toward the social environment. Such the self was conceived to be at the time when the traditional doctrine of a future life was formulated. With such a conception it is impossible to state a rational theory of immortality.

The only immortality which is possible is the immortality of function. The water of Niagara is constantly changing but the form of the fall remains. The material substance of my body changes but the continuity of selfhood is recognizable through the changes. The individual

has only a functional identity. Consciousness, *a* consciousness, *my* consciousness, like the moving picture in a kinetoscope, like a wave on the sea, like the vortex of a cyclone, has only a functional unity and continuity. Its individual *being* consists in what it persists in *doing*. Individuality has been defined as the "persistent realization of a particular type of structure." But what is this persistent realization? Not a persistence of the constituent elements of the tissues or cells. It is the persistence of a use, of a form or mode of behavior.

Such a doctrine as this introduced into the humanist philosophy might have a powerful influence in bringing together the various phases of religious worship, since it supports the view of a life together in that never-ending future mankind has so long believed in and longed for. Different radical religious sects can unite in a social synthesis of that traditional faith which now has scientific evidence to support it. Humanism needs just such a belief in immortality to bring together the various views which, at the present time, discredit it. As John Dewey says, "A true wisdom . . . discovers by thoughtful observation and experiment the method for administering the unfinished processes of existence so that frail goods shall be substantiated, secure goods be extended, and the precarious promises of good which haunt experienced things be more liberally fulfilled (*Experience and Nature*, pp. 76 f.).

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The Re-Creating of the Individual: A Study of Psychological Types and Their Relation to Psychoanalysis. By Beatrice M. Hinkle, M.D. (New edition.) New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1949. vii, 465 pp. 6 plates. $5.00.

Psychic Energy: Its Source and Goal. By M. Esther Harding, M.D. New York: Pantheon Books (Bollingen Series X), [1948]. xii, 497 pp. 10 plates. $4.50.

Since it would be impossible to review either of these two very important books thoroughly in the limited space available here (much less both of them), it seems advisable to limit this review to a consideration of the aspect of greatest interest to our readers, that is, the bearing of analytical psychology on religion. It has always seemed odd to this

reviewer that religionists interested in the use of depth psychology in pastoral counseling should have chosen Freud rather than Jung, when the latter has obviously so much more to offer. For Jung takes religion seriously as a necessary factor in psychological wholeness, and does not regard it as an "illusion"—a childish projection to be outgrown, the sooner the better.

These two works supplement each other most interestingly, for they represent two distinct phases in the development of the Jungian method: the pioneer phase, when Jung was beginning to find Freudian theory inadequate and, therefore, was forced to develop new theories and methods; and the later phase, in which he has developed the use of religious myths and symbols for the interpretation of dreams. Dr. Hinkle belongs among the pioneers, for she had begun the use of suggestion in her medical practice before her first encounter with the magic name of Freud. But it was this encounter, with his newly published *Studien über Hysterie,* in 1909, which sent her to Europe to study the new science at first hand. Her own analysis was "conducted in the most approved Freudian style," but when the split came between the Vienna and Zürich groups, she found herself on the side of the Jungians. She states her connection with Jung as follows:

> Although my work is closely related to Jung's, I do not present this book as an exposition of Jung's ideas. Every statement and deduction presented here has been made my own through personal study, testing and observation; therefore it is impossible for me to say what I have arrived at independently, and what is due to Jung. But, while not desiring to hold him in any way responsible for the ideas here set forth, I wish to acknowledge the great value and importance to me of his conceptions and his stimulating points of view (pp. 6 f.).

In Part I, Dr. Hinkle recounts the development of the psychoanalytic movement, clearly and concisely, with a forthright exposition of the fundamental differences in theory between Freud, Adler, and Jung with regard to the problems of sex, the child's relation to its parents, dream symbolism, the unconscious, etc. She finds Jung's first important deviation from Freud to lie in his discovery of the importance of the mother image as primary; "just as the problem of the father is the great fact of Freud's psychology, the problem of the mother is the essence of Jung's, with the struggle carried on between the two great forces of love and power" (pp. 10 f.).

It is in Part II that Dr. Hinkle makes her own original contributions to the study of analytical psychology. Her formulation of a theory of psychological types differs rather drastically from Jung's. She accepts his fundamental categories of extravert and introvert, but bases her subdivisions upon the varying degrees of subjectivity and objectivity found within these types, instead of on the four functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. It is interesting to note that the first edition of Dr. Hinkle's book appeared in 1923, the same year as Jung's *Psychological Types*. Neither of them had known about the other's book until it appeared in print.

In the chapters on "Masculine and Feminine Psychology," and "The Psychology of the Artist," Dr. Hinkle reveals a remarkable breadth of acquaintance with history and literature, especially with regard to the status of women in various cultures, on which she has done enough research for a Ph.D. dissertation! Her analysis of the psychology of artistic creation is equally penetrating, especially her study of Goethe as the outstanding example of that rare type of great artists who were also great men, "who have been able to utilize their life's experience for their own growth" (p. 355).

In her Introduction, Dr. Hinkle makes the statement that not only the neurotics are "sick souls" but also many "normal" people who have come to her for analysis.

> I found that they, too, were sick souls in spite of the frequently entirely successfulfilment in reality of their egotistic desires and the satisfactory attainment of a wished-for love object, . . . they too were driven, by a sense of inner discontent and incompleteness, to seek some new meaning and direction for life (p. 3).

Thus, the problem of psychology reveals itself as the basic problem of religion—the re-integration of the personality on a higher level. The last chapter of the book, "The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Spiritual Life," describes religion as "the supreme object and creation of the human mind, . . . the most universal and important of its achievements" (p. 418). Man's "belief in a personal power ordering the universe and concerned with the affairs of the individual" has been the greatest stimulus to achievement, for, by projecting into the world a God modeled on the image of the father, he created "an object greater than himself and beyond himself to which he must do homage" (p. 419).

In her analysis of Christianity, Dr. Hinkle stresses the fact that, though it went to extremes of asceticism in its reaction to pagan excesses of sensuality, this repression was a cultural and psychological necessity if man were to overcome his identification with nature and his bondage to irrational impulse. "The conception of himself as a special creation gave him the authority for achieving this differentiation" (p. 427). But today the problem is different. The physical desires have been weakened by centuries of repression, and the energy belonging to them has sunk into the unconscious, stimulating the development of the intellect. And now science, child of the intellect, has destroyed for so many the faith in a personal God and faith in man as a special creation. He now finds himself in the ignominious position of an accident in an impersonal universe in which nature is an enemy to be conquered. Here, Dr. Hinkle quotes the following from Slosson's *Creative Chemistry* (p. 431):

> She [nature] is our treacherous and unsleeping foe ever to be watched and feared and circumvented, for, at any moment and in spite of all our vigilance, she may wipe out the human race by famine, pestilence, or earthquake, and within a few centuries obliterate every trace of its achievement.

Her comment on this is illuminating:

> Could anything provide a greater contrast between the two modes of thought; that of religion and science—from a dependent, trusting, childlike attitude which associated nature with God, the highest good, and found her beneficent and kindly, to the critical, arrogant attitude of young manhood which dethrones God, the father, and becomes the enemy of Nature, the mother? Truly occidental man is arriving at the adolescent conflict! (p. 431).

The next step, of course, must be the achievement of maturity; only by transcending both the childish dependence and the adolescent defiance can man find his true place in the universe. We must follow "the path of individual responsibility—the path of moral autonomy." The aim of analytical psychology, like that of true religion, is the integration of all aspects of the psyche around a non-personal center vested with spiritual authority (such as St. Paul's "Christ within").

> The loss of religious faith in a personal God, residing somewhere outside of one's self, has produced the necessity, paradoxical as it seems, of removing the psychological emphasis from the outer circumstances and external aspects of life to the inner creative and becoming processes in the individual himself. This is the great spiritual need of modern man (p. 419).

The new science of psychology presents man with "an instrument which for the first time makes possible that further individual development or creation of self by self which formerly depended upon 'the grace of God' and was entirely bound up with religious creeds" (p. 419).

In illustration of these inner creative processes, Dr. Hinkle presents a number of drawings made by patients in the course of analysis, drawings, some of them in color, and many of them strangely beautiful and impressive, quite independent of artistic skill or lack of it. They portray the world of the imagination which Jung calls the collective unconscious, inhabited by the great archetypes which have dominated man's psychic life from times immemorial. They illustrate well the following statement by Dr. Hinkle:

> Mankind possesses many wishes. But there is one great and universal wish expressed in all religions, in all art and philosophy, and in all human life; *the wish to pass beyond himself as he now is,* the wish for a further attainment, for a new consciousness or a new state of being in which that greater unity and more harmonious psychic integration longed for, is an achieved reality (pp. 437 f.).

In the Oriental religions, in general, the responsibility for spiritual development rests entirely on the individual himself. The law of karma operates mechanically, without hope of divine interference. Only by the destruction of desire can man attain the bliss of release from the cycle of re-birth. "This is a religion of the intellect, demanding as stern a facing of subjective reality as science demands of objective reality" (p. 442). The impersonality which characterizes Oriental religion appears in the West in science itself. Dr. Hinkle quotes here a passage from Bertrand Russell which sounds strangely like the words of an Oriental mystic (p. 447):

> Except for those rare spirits that are born without sin, there is a cavern of darkness to be traversed before the temple can be entered. The gate of the cavern is despair, and its floor is paved with the gravestones of abandoned hopes. There self must die; there the eagerness, the greed of untamed desire must be slain, for only so can the soul be freed from the empire of Fate (from *Mysticism and Logic*).

Thus has science completed a full circle. Having destroyed the immature religious conceptions of the past, it now presents us with a new religion of renunciation of personal aims, and a technic for achieving the creation of a new humanity:

Through the application of this technic there have been produced all those psychic states known as mystic experiences which formerly were associated with the religious life, without the necessity of creed or faith or the use of religious rituals. It is science's offering in place of the religious beliefs which she has transformed (p. 448).

In keeping with all great methods of either scientific or religious character, it also contains the possibilities of deception and of destruction. Therefore, in one of the disparaging criticisms cast upon psychoanalysis, the accusation of its being only a cult, there is contained a note of danger and of warning. For no greater misfortune could befall psychoanalysis than for it to become a cult, or for something to be placed upon it other than its actual value—that of a psychological method by means of which that which is hidden is brought to light and the understanding of human psychological processes is made possible (pp. 448 f.).

Therefore, in spite of its close relation to religion and its parallel phenomena, the new psychology is neither a religion nor a substitute for it. Dr. Hinkle is quite clear about that: "Although psychoanalysis can hardly claim as yet complete scientific recognition, it is nevertheless under the banner of science rather than religion that it desires to march, and it is to the scientific spirit that it owes its origin" (p. 421).

The author of the second book, Dr. Harding, belongs, so to speak, to the second generation of Jungian analysts, and her work reflects the great interest in myth and religious symbolism which characterizes Jung's later phase. Once more she has put us in her debt with a book of unusual interest—a rich brew from her own particular alchemical retort, compounded of remarkable erudition in the field of comparative religion and the practical wisdom won from years of analytical practice. The book should be of special interest to readers of this *Review*, for it deals with a problem crucial in our day, modern man's search for a way back to religious experience through a new understanding of the symbols which have served so well for millenia but now have lost their meaning and their power. In Germany, for instance, the archetypal symbols of Christianity were simply unable to hold in check "the spirit of dynamism" which is the enemy of "the spirit of civilization." "These two world spirits, which Greek philosophy called 'the growing' and 'the burning,' stand in mortal combat, and we cannot foretell the outcome" (p. 6). The battle must first be fought out in the hearts of individuals, with the aid of both religion and psychology, for the aim of religious disciplines and analytical psychology alike is

cultural as well as therapeutic—the transformation of the entire personality.

In Chapter II, "The Transformation of the Instinctive Drives," Dr. Harding develops her thesis: "The gradual transformation that has taken place in the religions of the world runs parallel with the slow transformation of the nonpersonal and instinctive part of man's psyche" (p. 27). The nature gods represented not only the powers of nature in the external world, but also the instinctive nature within, and man was at the mercy of their whims.

> But as his psyche gradually emerged from its instinctive bondage and his power to control both himself and his environment grew greater, his religion also changed, passing through the stage in which the divine power was conceived of as a personal God concerned with the welfare of his worshippers but hating the heathen who did not serve him. This theological concept corresponds to the ego stage of psychological development. In all the more evolved religions, the central teaching has advanced beyond this stage and is concerned with the experience of a God within the psyche" (p. 27).

This final stage corresponds to the highest stage of individual development, in which the instincts and the ego have been replaced by a new center of consciousness, the Self, including the unconscious and nonpersonal aspects which Jung calls "the objective psyche"—in religious language, "the God within."

This identification of "the God within" with the Self, "the objective psyche," is somewhat disturbing to the student of religion. One is left with the uneasy feeling that, *if* God is transcendent as well as immanent—a belief which distinguishes theism from pantheism—Dr. Harding's system "has no need of such a hypothesis." She seems to feel that, in the "more evolved religions," the God within has superceded the God without, a conclusion which is hardly borne out by mystical writings in general. One must, therefore, take exception to the following statement: "These [experiences of God within the psyche] come to the initiated as a subjective experience; they are realized as being such and are understood as emanating not from a God in the heavens but from a God within" (p. 27). For St. Paul, "the Christ within" is *not* a different God superseding the God without, but the *same* Jesus Christ who died on the cross and rose from the dead, whom he saw in a vision on the rode to Damascus. For Arjuna "the purusha within the soul" was the same Krishna he knew in human form, and

who was revealed to him as Ishvara, Lord of the Universe, in the great theophany. Even in the Upanishads, the individual atman is divine only by virtue of its identification with the Brahman-Atman; it in no way *replaces* the Brahman-Atman! For religion, it is not either/or, but both/and. To the religionist, the following statement must seem a trifle patronizing:

> The exoteric teaching that postulates a God without, a denizen of heaven who looks down on his children from his celestial abode, caring for the bodily needs of man—and from whom "all good things do come," including spiritual thoughts, the blessing of divine grace, and redemption from sin—is usually considered more appropriate for the uninitiated worshipper" (pp. 27 f.).

One wonders what St. Teresa or Rāmānuja would say to that!

Part I, "The Sources of Psychic Energy," concerns itself with the biological structure of man and his instinctive nature. All cultural and psychological development has come from the freeing of psychic energy from the grip of blind instinct. Inertia, that "old enemy of Mankind," results when this energy is held captive in the unconscious, and much of primitive ritual has come into being for the purpose of rousing and channeling this dormant power toward useful ends. Hunger, the second great enemy, is closely related to religious practices, all the way from the primitive hunting dance and crude fertility rites to the elaborate "mysteries" of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, in which the simple need for daily bread has been transformed into a higher kind of hunger—the desire for regeneration through the mystical communion of a sacramental meal. So, too, the basic need for self-defence has found both justification and reinforcement in religion in the form of warrior gods who fight on the side of their people. From the actual need for self defence has developed a pair of psychological opposites, enmity and friendship, for hostility toward the enemies of the tribe must be balanced by co-operation and peaceful dealings within it, if man is to survive at all. Also, the spirit of brotherhood is fostered among fighting men, with loyalty to the comrade in arms a paramount virtue. The institution of knighthood in the Middle Ages represents the highest idealization of the warrior.

In two excellent chapters on Reproduction, Dr. Harding discusses the part this biological need has played in psychological development. The ambivalence of nature is shown in the positive and negative as-

pects of this basic instinct. From sexuality, neutral in itself, have come the pair of opposites known as lust and love; and from maternity, a simple biological fact, the nourishing and the devouring aspects.

It is Part II, "The Transformation of Psychic Energy," which will be of greatest interest to our readers, for it illustrates the use of mythological and symbolic material for the understanding of human psychology characteristic of Jungian analysis. In her discussion of the dragon myth, Dr. Harding makes use of Dr. H. G. Baynes's "renegade hypothesis," by which he means the all-too-human tendency to give up the struggle and relapse into the primordial inertia. In the Siegfried story, the treasure lies hidden beneath the bulk of the sleeping Fafnir, who replies to Siegried's challenge, *Lass mich schlafen.* The hero's task is to rouse and conquer this primitive inertia. But often the renegade within the psyche appears in active and more dangerous form, and we find our dragons making incursions into human life, destroying the higher values. This calls for the active intervention of a hero, and St. George appears in shining armor, a savior-hero, symbol of the redeemed man, victor over the renegade. The story of Jonah is also given a psychological interpretation. Here the hero himself plays the renegade, and it takes a terrifying experience with the unconscious (the whale) to bring him to accept the task laid upon him. The extreme form of this renegade regression is schizophrenia, which Dr. Harding analyzes in a very telling way.

The circle, as symbolizing the psyche as a whole, is discussed in the last three chapters. The goal of the process of psychic development which Jung calls individuation is wholeness or completeness, and the symbol representing this desired state appears in the dream and phantasy of the patient as well as in many religions. Wholeness implies the reconciliation of the two aspects of the psyche, the conscious and the unconscious, and the bringing together of all aspects of the personality into harmonious relationships. To hold the conflicting elements together, a container is essential, such as the hermetic vessel of the alchemist, in which the transformation of the elements takes place. In Oriental symbolism, it is the *mandala,* a geometrical diagram used in meditation practice. Dr. Harding's illustrations include a number of beautiful representations of this symbol reproduced from drawings made by patients in the course of analysis, as well as extremely interesting examples from alchemical texts.

The final chapter, "The Transformation of the Libido: The Hermetic Vessel," is the most fascinating part of the book, for it introduces us into the mysterious realm of medieval alchemy. Unfortunately, there is no room here to review it adequately—it must be read carefully to be appreciated. Quotations from the writings of famous alchemists are used with great effect, and are accompanied by a commentary full of insight, revealing the depth of Dr. Harding's delvings in this obscure field. Once again science has completed a full circle—this time a regression into a mystical pseudo-science of the past in search of the philosopher's stone, "the stone rejected by the builders." As the French say, *reculer pour mieux sauter!*

Analytical psychology has come a long way in the twenty-five years which lies between the writing of these two books, but in which direction has it progressed? It is true that some find in it a substitute for religion, and "the Self" a substitute for God, but, in the main, it may still be said, "it is nevertheless under the banner of science rather than religion that it desires to march."

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BOOK NOTES

Ugaritic Mythology: A Study of the Leading Motifs. By Julian Obermann. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. xxiv, 110 pp. $2.75.

The title and sub-title of this book are inexact. The study deals with but one aspect of the Baal myth, namely, how Baal, in spite of the enmity of some of the older gods, succeeded in having a house erected for himself. The building motif constitutes only a part of the Baal myth (which is, in essence, a fertility myth), and the Baal myth itself represents only one part of the Ugaritic mythology; thus, the title embraces more than this little book offers.

Professor Obermann's reconstruction of the fragments relating to the building saga, his philological interpretations and exegeses, constitute a valuable advance in the understanding of these texts. Of particular interest, and for which the author deserves great credit, is his successful utilization of social and economic data as a means of gaining a better insight into these ancient texts—a thing which most students of Ugaritic mythology have neglected to do. Obermann correctly rejects the hitherto accepted interpretation that Baal married his sister Anat. This is in accordance with the marriage customs of the Semites as opposed to those of the Egyptians, where brother-sister marriages were common among all classes; while, on the other hand, his marrying three "lassies" is in conformity with the Canaanite polygamous family. The rejection by El of Athar's plea for permission to build a house for himself, on the ground that he was unmarried at the time, is well taken indeed (cf. Gen. 30:30).

The author is probably right when he says that the curious notion of Baal that his house should have no windows was based on fear that his newly acquired wives might be snatched away by his enemies, although some allusion to magic may have been at play here. That the rivalry between Baal and El, on the one hand, and the fact that Baal's house was to be built of gold and silver, on the other hand, reflect "a recent crisis in the Ugaritic community . . . a crisis occasioned by the advance of technology, the emergence of the smith and the foundry" is highly conjectural, since we do not know the date of the composition of these texts.

I. M.

Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient Near East. By C. J. Gadd. (The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1945.) London: Oxford University Press, 1948. 101 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*

This stimulating and lucidly written book concerns itself, as the title indicates, with the ideas held by the peoples of ancient Western Asia about the divine rule of gods and kings. The problem of the deification of Near Eastern kings has been the subject of investigation in a number of books published recently in this country and abroad. Gadd's book is a valuable addition to the

list and will be received by students interested in this field as a most worthy contribution.

The book is divided into three parts: "The God," "The King," and "The People." In the first part, the author discusses the struggle of a god (or group of gods) against other gods for supremacy in heaven and upon earth. This conflict, attested in all Near Eastern mythologies, usually precedes the act of creation and is often a violent one, accompanied by the shedding of blood and the total annihilation of the preceding generation of deities. The creation of man (considered as an incidental act in Egyptian mythology) was accomplished by the Babylonian gods with a definite purpose, namely, that he relieve them from the arduous task of toiling for their own sustenance. In order that man may accomplish this, the gods bestowed upon him all kinds of skills, particularly, the skill of architecture, so that he may build "houses" for them on earth, in which they could live a life of ease and plenty. Then follows a highly interesting and exceedingly pointed discourse on the various methods of intercourse between the two races, the transmission of the divine will in pre-historic and historic times by way of divination and prophecy.

In the second chapter, the author deals with the origin of kingship, which, according to some Babylonian texts, was in existence prior to the creation of man. The function of the king, at least in early Sumer, was to be the manager of the local deities' estates on earth, and his obligation consisted in providing for the gods their needs in food and habitation. As such he was also a priest, the connecting link between the deity and the people. The topics discussed in the third chapter embrace the relationship of the people to the gods and to the king, their participation in religious rites and festivals, and the function of divination and magic.

It is to be regretted that Gadd did not elaborate more fully on the problem of the so-called deification of some of the Mesopotamian kings. On pages 47-48 he states:

> Divinity of kings, in the lands outside Egypt, was a conception which fluctuated rather in show than in reality. . . . The king is always upon the point of stepping over into the god, and yet is always subordinate. This awkward suspense has given rise to much recent discussion of the actual divinity of Oriental kings, which has been viewed in relation to the customs and beliefs of primitive peoples studied by anthropologists in our own age, while other scholars have more relevantly confined themselves to examining the language and rites of the ancient civilized peoples concerning their kings. This discussion can find no place here, but it may be said in general that the result is to find divinity constantly implied, seldom averred.

This reviewer would go even further: the theory that Mesopotamian kings (and, according to some, even Israelite kings!) were, in fact, deified is based on purely imaginative evidence.

I. M.

L'Hermétisme. By A.-J. Festugière. (K. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundets i Lund Årsberättelse, 1947-1948, I.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1948. 58 pp.

Father Festugière, who is engaged with Professor Nock of Harvard in editing and translating the Hermetic writings with commentary (an *excellent* job thus far), has given three lectures, here published, which form an introduction to the texts. Like all good introductions, it is a masterful final summary. It will give at once a brief and a comprehensive interpretation of one of the most difficult phenomena of antiquity.

In the first lecture, Festugière begins with an excellent literary introduction to the documents, and ends by emphasizing their difference in form and doctrine. He oddly concludes that these differences militate against their having been the "Bible" of a sect. Far greater divergences in both senses have not kept the Jewish-Christian books from becoming a Bible. When he goes on to say that he sees no trace in the Hermetic books of their having belonged to a group which formed a "mystery" *au sens propre,* that is, he arbitrarily defines, an organization with a cult, we wonder why he has again had to beg this old question. The ancients used "mystery" both for cultic organizations and for religious movements which seem, without organization, to have expressed themselves largely in private devotion. To say that for the ancients to use the word in this double sense was not "proper" is indeed to project a modern distinction into the ancient world, a modern distinction which has only served to confuse the modern mind itself as to what a Greek-speaking person meant by a "mystery." That is a small matter, however, at least in this little study.

The author goes on to describe the "Revelation of Hermes" itself. It consists essentially, he says, in a new kind of knowledge, not the knowledge for its own sake which, he says, was sought in classical Greece, but knowledge which will ensure salvation. Saving knowledge, later schools or cults thought, comes by the fact that the mind of man is a part of God. Classic thought in all schools, the author thinks, ended essentially in agnosticism, but with the later saving knowledge the human mind could hope to know the Ultimate, for to know the ultimate was essentially only a deeper form of self-knowledge. In all of this, Festugière's contrasts between the attitudes of classical and late antiquity are interesting, but seem to me too sharply drawn.

In the next two lectures, he goes on to outline the doctrine of salvation. It is the familiar story of the fall of the Radiation, or Son, of God as it, or he, becomes attracted by matter, so that at length man is a hybrid of matter and spirit, and seeks a way back to God by leaving everything material behind. In terms of the Hermetic documents, Festugière describes the complications of this picture with admirable lucidity, and then compares the system as a whole with paganism in general, on the one hand, and Christianity, on the other. The citations from the later Greek philosophers, especially Plotinus, are remarkably telling. It seems to me that Festugière's faults here and

throughout are only those of the perfection of his own rationality. The deep contrast which he draws and illustrates so tellingly between these three points of view are sustained, it seems to me, only by apt quotations. In practice, or in the texts themselves, the three are by no means so far, or so neatly, apart as he represents. One not brought up or trained in the tradition of Catholic rationalism always feels that the precision of structure presented by those so trained is largely in their own minds, and we come back to the data of life with a peculiar sense that most of what we experience cannot be fitted into their elaborate columbaria. This will be the experience of one who returns from the clarity of Festugière to what is still the confusion of the Hermetic documents themselves. But the clarity of Festugière remains a brilliant and delightful accomplishment.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH

The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos. By CECIL ROTH. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1948. xvi, 250 pp. 15 illustrations. $3.00.

This account of the successes and failures of Joseph Nasi, last Duke of Naxos, is a sequel to Cecil Roth's earlier treatment of Doña Gracia, Joseph's aunt and mother-in-law. Both books serve as an extended commentary to the history of the Marranos (crypto-Jews) after the Spanish expulsion of the Jews in 1492 and the forced conversion of 1497 in their Portuguese "refuge." In a sense, then, this book and its predecessor hark back to Roth's *History of the Marranos,* published in this country in 1932.

In the two volumes of *The House of Nasi,* however, Roth displays his chief actors on a new stage, that of the sixteenth century Turkish empire. Here, under most favorable conditions, Doña Gracia became a patroness of letters and scholarship, and Don Joseph, one of the outstanding political and financial figures of the age. His friendship with Selim II, the Sultan of Turkey, led to his being invested with the formerly Christian Duchy of Naxos, and, though at this point the story is both less credible and less certain, with the Voivodeship of Wallachia. These grants and his semi-feudal overlordship of Tiberias and seven surrounding villages in Palestine give evidence that this almost forgotten figure was the last Jewish "sovereign" and "prince."

Roth has told his story well, bringing together hints from a wide variety of sources into a coherent narrative. Some of his deductions of proto-Zionist interests on the part of Don Joseph should be discounted; this caution seems particularly necessary in the account of Joseph's reasons for encouraging the Turkish conquest of Cyprus. Some writer of historical fiction should concern himself with the house of Nasi.

J. L. B.

Tales of the Hasidim. Vol. II: *The Later Masters.* By MARTIN BUBER. New York: Schocken Books, 1948. 352 pp. $3.75.

In his earlier volume of tales of "the early masters" of Hasidism, Martin Buber retold many of the legends clustering about the lives of the first two generations, and some few members of the third generation of these spiritual leaders in Jewry. In this continuation of his work as expounder of latter-day Jewish mysticism, Buber begins with the masters of the third generation, previously omitted, and carries his material, in some cases, down to the beginning of the twentieth century. David Moshe, of Tchortkov, the latest of the Hasidim to be immortalized in Buber's work, lived until 1903. Thus this volume gives a panoramic view of Hasidism in the nineteenth century.

This is the period during which the dynastic phase of Hasidism, called Zaddikism, emerged. Even such friendly critics of Hasidism as Solomon Schechter, first president of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, found little to praise in Zaddikism; it seems to Schechter to represent a decadent aspect of the movement, a falling away from the pure spirituality of the earlier generations. It is, therefore, of particular interest to our generation to see how Buber's reinterpretation of the relation between each Zaddik and his followers escapes the charge of decadence.

Buber does this by the statement that "the structure of the hasidic community was fundamentally characterized by a multiplicity which could not merge into a unity." Every assertion, then, of superior and central authority by an individual is an intrusion into the spirit of Hasidism; on the other hand, the Hasidic norm of multiplicity and communal pluralism is expressed by the multiplicity of Zaddikim. Only in this plural leadership could Hasidism realize its historic mission of restoring the essence of Judaism after the nihilistic and antinomian crises of Shabbethian and Frankist messianism. The whole people had to be prevented from "putting their faith in any single human." This laudable intention might sometimes be carried to excess; it is not, however, by the excesses that the movement should be judged.

What Buber does admit is not a decadence in the later period but a shift of emphasis. The initial impulse, the "crude power," of the early generations is abated in the later. Hasidism has become an organized religious movement, with the saving graces of congregational autonomy and multiple leadership. "The main outlines of the first hasidic tidings and struggles become complicated or blurred, and the sacred passion to bring heaven and earth closer to each other often gives place to the kind of organized religiosity we can trace in every great religious movement which persists past the generations of awakening and revolt." This must not, however, be construed as decay. True, the basic ideas are not deepened, but they are expanded by a variety of interpretations and an abundance of applications to the problems of living. The shift in emphasis is paralleled by a shift in literary expression; the ideas are stated with "less elemental vigor but often more brilliance."

Thus Buber is saying, in effect, that if we are looking in this later period for the ardent and engrossing spirituality of the earlier, we will be disappointed and disheartened; but if we are content to judge the later period of Hasidism as a legitimate religious movement in its own right, we will find in it much that, by its enrichment and enhancement of Hasidic themes, can strengthen and enrich our own lives.

J. L. B.

Israel and the World; Essays in a Time of Crisis. By MARTIN BUBER. New York: Schocken Books, 1948. 255 pp. $3.75.

Israel and the World contains many particular and *ad hoc* applications of Martin Buber's religious philosophy, and many highly suggestive extensions of his thought into areas scarcely touched upon in his major works. These essays were written over a period of thirty years; themes of the earlier essays are picked up anew and developed further in the later ones. There is no attempt at systematic presentation. The scattered character of the essays, unavoidable though it may be in such a collection, serves to prevent appreciation of the quality of Buber's mind by new readers. Those who have read the author's major writings, however, or those who are familiar with his thought from other sources will find this a rich and rewarding collection, especially as it contributes to an understanding of Buber's idea of community and of his philosophy of history.

J. L. B.

A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. Fascicle I. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948. x, 262 pp. $12.50.

The reading of any philosopher in a language other than the original presents the reader with special semantic difficulties over and above those with which he must cope when he reads a philosophic text in the language in which it was set down. In the case of Thomas Aquinas, who represents a tradition in which philosophical terms were used with technical exactness, it is best if we read him in Latin, second best if we read him in English with an accompanying Latin text to which we can refer when the question of the meaning of a word arises. But even if we turn from the English version of the disputed word to its Latin original, we shall not arrive at a satisfactory answer unless we know in what sense or senses Thomas conventionally uses the word. To this end, a reliable lexicon provides invaluable assistance.

Not since the appearance of the *Thomas-Lexicon* by Ludwig Schütz, in 1895, has there been available a lexicon comparable in scope and authority to Professor Roy Deferrari's *Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas,* the initial fascicle of which (words from A to C inclusive) is now in print. While this publication is a general rather than a specifically philosophical lexicon, it will

excellently serve the interests of those who turn to the Latin text of the angelic doctor in order to seek the *intentio Thomae.* No lexicon of classical Latin can possibly provide the means to determine the sense of words in the philosophical vocabulary of the high Middle Ages. By way of obvious illustration—if we take the word *conceptio* from the text of the *Summa Theologica* and look it up in a classical lexicon such as Freund's, we are likely to be misled as to what Thomas intended to designate by the word. The present lexicon, based on the *Summa Theologica* and selected passages of Thomas' other works, lists each of the many ways in which Thomas uses the word, together with quoted passages to illustrate typical contexts.

For undertaking the heavy task of a lexicon of these dimensions, Professor Deferrari and his associates deserve the gratitude of scholars, who will look forward to the happy completion of the project.

J. G. B.

Den evangeliska bönelitteraturen i Danmark 1526-1575. By KRISTER GIEROW. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1948. viii, 440 pp. Kr. 12.

When Luther published his *Betbüchlein,* he broke with Catholic tradition that ascribed meritorious value to prayer. The whole system of medieval devotion was looked upon as a work of righteousness meriting God's favor. The *Betbüchlein* was not so much a new evangelical prayer book as a book of instruction in how each Christian, out of his personal experience and need, should pray. But the traditional form could not be entirely abolished. People needed guidance in prayer, and so many prayer books, hymn books, books of devotion, comfort and consolation in times of sorrow, meditations on death, and contemplation of the bliss of heaven, appeared in the Lutheran countries. Books of devotion based on the Lord's Prayer, and the Catechism, intended for family as well as private use appeared in great variety. This type of literature arose especially in Germany. It was little affected by the theological controversies of the period of orthodoxy. From Germany this literature came to Denmark and Sweden either as translations or in books patterned on the German models. Only in recent years has this type of literature been given serious study. The first scholarly work in this field was Paul Althaus' *Forschungen zur evangelischen Gebetsliteratur* (1927). Similar research has been made with reference to Swedish devotional literature by Sigfrid Estborn, in his *Evangeliska Svenska Bönböcker under Reformationstidevarvet* (1929), and by David Lindquist, in his *Studier i den Svenska Andaktslitteraturen under Stormaktstidevarvet* (1939).

The volume under review is the result of similar research in the evangelical prayer literature in Denmark during the Reformation period, 1526-1575. The author calls his work *En Källanalytisk-typologisk Studie* (a typological study based on an analysis of the sources), by which he means that the material is analyzed according to character and type. The author includes in his study

not only what may be strictly called "prayer books," but also such devotional literature as books for private meditations and hymn books. These usually included devotional material. The "psalmbook" became in fact a real "folk-book," the common people's Bible. Of special interest are the chapters on the "Ars Moriendi" literature, and what may be called "the mirror for daily living" (*Hustavlans böner*). "The art of dying" and the art of Christian living in one's earthly calling in the light of eternity are equally the object of daily concern. Here are prayers and counsel for all conditions and occupations. The book contains an analysis of a large number of books under the various types. Here is uncovered a rich mine of material that might well be translated into devotional books for today.

OSCAR N. OLSON

Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing, Spiritual Preparation for the Office of Confession. By SØREN KIERKEGAARD. Translated from the Danish with an Introductory Essay by Douglas V. Steere, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. 220 pp. $2.50.

Ten years ago when Kierkegaard's name was virtually unknown in the English-speaking world and when a ninety-three page book called *Philosophical Fragments* was the only one of his many volumes to be found in English, Harper and Brothers very courageously ventured to bring out Douglas V. Steere's translation of *Purity of Heart.* If it was a courageous venture, it has not proved, at any rate, a foolhardy one. A decade later, at insistent public demand, a new edition has had to appear.

Purity of Heart, written in 1847, is a searching meditation on a verse from the Epistle of St. James: "Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you. Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts, ye double minded" (4:8). To read this book with care is to know oneself pursued by "The Hound of Heaven." A relentless Kierkegaard shows us that our every attempted escape from God is a cul-de-sac. As Mr. Steere remarks in his excellent introduction:

> Kierkegaard conceived it his function as a writer to strip men of their disguises, to compel them to see evasions for what they are, to label blind alleys, to cut off men's retreats, to tear down the niggardly roofs they continue to build over their precious sun-dials, to isolate men from the crowd, to enforce self-examination, and to bring them solitary and alone before the Eternal.

That which Kierkegaard chiefly held against his age was its contempt for the individual human being. He saw what was coming: the dehumanization of man. Totalitarian politics and industrial technics have served to prove that his fears were not ill founded. *Purity of Heart* is one of many books in which Kierkegaard sought to rescue the individual from "massification" by compelling him to stand alone before God. "Religion," he said, "is the true humanity." Or, in another place:

This is my faith, that however much there may be that is confused an evil and detestable in men who have become that irresponsible thing without possibility of repentence which we call the "public," the "crowd," there is just as much truth and goodness and loveliness in them when one can get hold of the individual. Oh! and in what a high degree would men become—men, and lovable men, if they would become individuals before God!

HOWARD A. JOHNSON

Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. By REIDAR THOMTE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. x, 228 pp. $3.50.

This is a straightforward summary of the main points of Kierkegaard's thought. It is relatively brief, tracing the developments in orderly fashion through the various stages and turns of his successive publications. It draws properly upon some of the recent work in the field. One of its most valuable features is its thorough and scholarly documentation in both primary and secondary sources. There is also a useful index. Experts may find the book lacking in that it does not penetrate some of Kierkegaard's profundities or subtleties. Except for some treatment of the doctrines of repetition or recollection and "contemporaneity with Christ," the more difficult places seem to be avoided. The author makes almost no attempt either to shield or to criticize Kierkegaard. Melancholy is held to account for the broken engagement; the influence of this on Kierkegaard's authorship is acknowledged, as well as made clear between the lines. About the only mark of the devotee is the cool—or perhaps one should say, warm—comparison of Kierkegaard with Plato (p. 209).

Unless the reader is looking for an exhaustive treatise, in this brief, clean cut work there is little to criticize. The book, however, does make it easy to criticize Kierkegaard. The whole Kierkegaard corpus is, of course, wide open for Freudian strictures, but, with or without Freud, one must grant that in a world made up of all sorts of persons there will be some whom melancholy has marked for her own, and there will be many men besides Dante, Beethoven, and (according to folklore) Lincoln, who will suffer because of impossible or lost loves. In such a world we should be thankful, rather than cynical, when we find that there are compensations and sublimations available. The point is not that men should not have compensations and sublimations, among which those afforded by religion have always been among the foremost; the point is that men should find the right ones, those with an authentic ring.

The serious question, in the current trend toward Kierkegaard, is whether the difficulties which in our time beset traditional Christian doctrine receive an adequate answer in Kierkegaard's subjectivity, pathos, and hunger for eternal happiness. For Kierkegaard (quoting now from Professor Thomte's exposition), "The question is not, 'Is the individual related to something which is objectively true?' but 'Is the relationship a true relationship?' The

emphasis is moved from the dogmatic and objective realm to the subjective and psychological realm of appropriation" (p. 114). Quoting from Kierkegaard, "If only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth, even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true" (p. 115). Professor Thomte says that since there is a "reduplication" of thought in the life of the individual, the relationship is regarded as true relationship (p. 116.) Again from Kierkegaard, "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth, attainable for an existing individual" (p. 110). This, unmistakeably, is the will to believe (cf. p. 128); with all its longing, vital interest, and pathos, it is wishful philosophizing, theologizing. Faith is repeatedly said to be absurd (pp. 56 ff., 72, 94), and one must believe against the understanding (p. 109).

In the Goethe bicentennial we have been recently reminded of the wave of suicides which is said to have followed the publication of *Werther*. We do not need a Kierkegaard now to set up a wave of melancholy; our age furnishes its own melancholy and frustration and tragedy to multitudes. Our age, too, may carry to great lengths what eighteenth century French thought attempted and on the whole failed to do; it may render Christian doctrines, formulated in traditional or neo-traditional ways, too weak for any but the staunchest defenders of the citadel to hold. All these defenders may look for help to Kierkegaard, but if they rely on his subjectivity or introversion, they will lean on a broken reed. From Kant and Hume to some of the logical positivists and semanticists, subjectivism sooner or later reveals its weakness. Hegel, against whom Kierkegaard reacted so emphatically, was fantastic, but, at least, he was objective. Let us grant that there is no truth, especially no religious truth, which is not subjectively apprehended; but for all that, only objective philosophies, including philosophies of religion, philosophies which can authenticate themselves objectively, are strong enough permanently to bear the battle.

GEORGE P. CONGER

Kirche und Öffentlichkeit: Zur Grundlegung einer lutherischen Kulturethik. By HELMUT THIELICKE. Tübingen: Furche-Verlag, 1947. 127 pp. D.M. 4.20.

The theme of this book, one of several recent publications by the author, is the intimate and necessary connection between the gospel and public life. It is, in effect, an explanation of how one can move out from the Church into the problems of society. Like many recent books, it is full of alternatives to be rejected, ranging in this case from Roman Catholicism to the Confessional Church. In these cases the analysis is penetrating but not particularly new.

Thielicke is one of a group of theologians concerned with how the Church can become relevant to every vocation. This book is one of a series of re-

searches carried on by the Evangelical Academy. At Bad Boll, for example, lawyers, educators, politicians, etc. have come together to consider what Christianity means for their own vocations and for the problems of their own time. The intention is that the Christian ethic penetrate into the very fabric of life. The emphasis is not on action but on how Christianity can inform the kind of action in which men inevitably engage in their respective tasks. The significance of such enterprises cannot be overestimated. Nevertheless, this book suffers from an insufficient appreciation of the implications which Christianity has for the transformation of the structures of society.

Theologically, Thielicke has a very suggestive analysis of the problem of the orders of creation (*Schöpfungsordnungen*). He insists that they must be understood as arising within the context of the human situation, that is, in the midst of fallen humanity. They are structural necessities in a world of sin. They are from God, but they are not the creation of God as a part of the very structure of creation. They are given to men in their situation by God. Historically, Thielicke suggests that Luther understood the orders in relation to the Fall of Man but then proceeded to elevate them into an eternal dimension. This, he feels, made for ambiguity; nevertheless, Neo-Lutheranism took up the second aspect of Luther without understanding the first. In short, the orders of creation, in the traditional sense, are Neo-Lutheran; they are not found in this form in Luther's thought.

Although the author distinguishes between creation and sin, he implies that creation should not be thought of apart from sin. This makes it possible to suggest that the relation of the gospel to the world must take into account the problem of sin as a part of the created order as we know it. This means that the relationship of God to the world is in personal terms, since it is man as man who is the problem and the one to whom the gospel must speak in all relationships.

This is a comparatively original and stimulating book. It is an attempt to show the relevance of Christianity for all men, but its difficulty is that of much of continental thought, namely, the lack of any rigorous concern with what Christianity means for change in social relationships in addition to the transformation of individuals.

JOHN DILLENBERGER

The Dialogues of G. de Purucker. Edited by ARTHUR L. CONGER. Covina, California: Theosophical University Press, 1948, 3 Vols., 1394 pp. $20.00.

Here is material of value, but in a very specialized field. The volumes require considerable background in Theosophical literature for even a casual reading. Dr. de Purucker followed Mrs. Katherine Tingley in the leadership of one of the several groups claiming a sole apostolic succession from the original Theosophical Society (founded in New York by Madame Blavatsky and others in 1875), and his contribution is marred by what is yet the hall-

mark of the occult mind, namely, the conviction of a very private and superior source of spiritual information. He refers to Katherine Tingley as "the greatest Esotericist of the three Leaders and Teachers who have preceded me . . ." and affirms that "there is but one line of authentic specific esoteric teaching . . . and this our own Holy Order is it."

These pages comprise stenographic reports of work done in a study group restricted to students pledged to secrecy, who met through a period ranging from 1929 to 1942, and the dialogues have an organic integrity which gradually develops the twin doctrines of the stream of consciousness and the nonexistence of immortality. The ideas are not new, nor here to be encountered for the first time in man's intellectual history, but the discussions bring a clarity to some very central insights in Theosophical thinking.

Theosophy as here presented differs from the more familiar conception of a spiritual denominator common to all religions, and is put forth as a purified version of Buddhism as such. A fundamental animism becomes the basis for an intricate but not necessarily difficult pattern of interacting dimensions or hierarchies of what, for lack of more exact terms, might be called pure time and pure space. In another form of expression, all manifestation is a ramification of consciousness in and through itself as a phase of a divine evolution. Man is a composite entity in which all these evolutionary factors most immediately converge, and he is seen as identical with God in the fact of this convergence. The discrete individual is non-existent, and so non-immortal, except in the actuality and manner of his participation in the general stream of consciousness. Free will is purpose as an assumption of self-direction in this process of participating in the whole, that is, a change in focus from macrocosm to microcosm, and karma is not the denial of free will but an emphasis on the orderliness of the whole. Man realizes himself as he employs rather than suffers the evolutionary factors continually coming to center in himself.

MARC EDMUND JONES

Religion through the Ages: An Anthology. Edited by HERMON F. BELL and CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. 445 pp. $5.00.

Like so many book titles, this promises more than it delivers, for while it does bring together religious utterances from men as far apart in time as Cleanthes in 300 B.C. and some who lived until the dawn of the twentieth century, it is, after all, by no means representative of religion as a whole during that long spread of time. As a matter of fact, outside of the Christian contributors, there are only three: Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Cleanthes—all the rest fall within the orbit of the Christian faith. There is nothing at all from religion in any of the Eastern cultures.

From a casual perusal of the anthology, it is somewhat difficult to see just

what is the common thread that binds the selections together. In the introduction, we are told that the common link is that of belief in God. If this does not seem immediately apparent to the casual reader, it does not in the least detract from the intrinsic value of the large number of selections from the great religious thinkers of the past. That more might well have been said by way of introduction and explanation seems evident to the reviewer.

The assembling of the material of the anthology was done by Hermon F. Bell, of Brooklyn, New York—a man ordinarily engaged in the business of public accounting. Why should such a person produce such a volume? The story is told in a substantial introduction by the veteran writer, Charles S. MacFarland.

It seems that, in 1905, Dr. Macfarland gave the Alumni Address at the Divinity School of Yale University, where Hermon F. Bell, a student, heard the lecture and later sought an interview with him. Bell, who, at Amherst had come under the influence of Professor Charles E. Garman of the Philosophy Department, and now a student of theology at Yale, was none too happy in that institution. He had become extremely liberal, so liberal that he had difficulty in finding a place within the Congregational ministry of his time. He then became a Unitarian, but found that not wholly to his liking, and, in the end, gave up the ministry and sought employment in the business world. But he never gave up his theological interests, and, through the years, has continued to read widely in the field of religion. Out of this reading emerged the present collection. The experience of Hermon Bell, seen against the background of the period, makes an interesting study in contrasts, and is not without its value for an appreciation of the changes that have taken place in the religious scene during the last forty years.

Mr. Bell omits from his anthology purposely any material from the Bible, but draws upon the inspiration of such great mystics and poets and thinkers as Fénelon, Bryant, Carlyle, Thomas à Kempis, Whittier, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Victor Hugo, Browning, and Tennyson. Those who find stimulus and refreshment for their spirits in some of the nobler utterances of the great figures of the past will find the work of value.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

A History of the Young Women's Christian Association. By ANNA V. RICE. New York: The Woman's Press, 1948. 299 pp. $2.00.

In this volume, which portrays the adventures of a small group of devout and intelligent women, we see a world wide organization built up block by block, as the leaders tried to meet successive problems confronting young women—problems which were new to all of them, since all were involved in the conditions resulting from the developing industrial era and what we know as the woman movement.

No sooner was one problem resolved than others came into view, and it

is to the credit of the organization heads that they were aware of these problems and studying them before they had become known to the rank and file. They were always progressive and courageous, often in the face of severe criticism. Having a world viewpoint precluded provincialism. But since all sections of the world do not live at the same tempo or enjoy the same social and economic advantages, it was not to be expected that women of all sections would share the same ideas as to standards of behavior and values. Nor did they all agree that an organization created to serve young women had a responsibility in regard to their environment.

The leaders learned early that they must reconcile unity of purpose with diversity of method. They could not remain indifferent to social and economic conditions which prevented the realization of wholesome life. Because of their concern for the individual, they were concerned with laws and customs of society which were out of harmony with the teachings of Christ. They saw that applying a practical program of helpfulness would depend largely for its success upon trained leaders able to adapt and interpret it effectively in widely divergent areas.

Inspiring, recruiting, and training young women for their roles in a new profession that girdled the world; organizing frequent conferences in widely dispersed centers to maintain unity of purpose and understanding; financing and administering such work on the world front without previous experience or established precedent; and, through it all, pioneering as an ecumenical group committed to certain loyalties of faith and practice which they adhered to even when driven far afield of their original doctrinal position as disciples of Christ, since all who called Him Lord were felt to have a place within their borders in spite of differences—all of this was compassed within fifty years or less. And this is the drama which Miss Rice unfolds in her history of the World's Young Women's Christian Association.

ANNE REILEY NESOM

Group Experience and Democratic Values. By GRACE L. COYLE. New York: The Woman's Press, 1948. 185 pp. $2.75.

This book is a penetrating discussion of human values inherent in group life. Its main purpose, as I understand it, is to emphasize the potentialities of voluntary group experience under the guidance of a skilled leader, with special emphasis on the character and function of that leader.

Miss Coyle has woven together a collection of papers presented by her at conferences and conventions. The first section begins with a broad discussion of the individual need for association in voluntary groups, with an analysis of function of the various types of leadership required. In the second section, five chapters are devoted to a discussion of group work as it relates to recreation, education, etc. Chapters 4 and 6 contain a well thought out statement of the development of group work as a profession. In the final section, Miss Coyle

presents a philosophical basis for group work, and a discussion of the philosophy underlying agency goals.

DANIEL CARPENTER

Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance. By ROBERT H. BONTHIUS. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. xi, 254 pp. $3.25.

The relation of Christian thought to the formulations of modern psychotherapy is receiving increasing attention in many quarters today. This book is a contribution to this study. Taking the experience of healthy self-acceptance as a sine qua non of spiritual well-being, the author examines the formulations of this experience in the writings of modern psychotherapists and in three schools of Christian thought.

The first Christian pathway considered is characterized as teaching self-rejection. In the service of God the self is renounced. It is found predominantly in Calvin and in modern neo-orthodoxy. A second Christian pathway is the forensic. This point of view conceives life in terms of religious and moral regulation, with emphasis on self-regulation, employing legalistic methods of guidance. The Roman Catholic Church is cited as an outstanding example of this approach. A third Christian pathway is called the melioristic, because it teaches with confidence that life can be more and more harmonious for man. Self-affirmation under God and co-operation with God are important steps on this pathway, an outstanding exponent of which is John Wesley.

The fourth chapter examines the modern psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance. Seven case histories are cited, each taken from the published work of writers in this field. Then general formulations are drawn from the writings of therapists.

In the final chapter, Christian formulations are evaluated in the light of the therapeutic formulations. Here the author displays a healthy capacity for critical judgment of both religion and psychotherapy. Religion needs to modify some of its teachings and practices in the light of psychotherapy. One point, among others, is to give up its moralism in approaching human problems. Psychotherapy needs to balance its principle of autonomy with the principle of heteronomy, else it will issue in specious individualism.

This book serves several important functions at the present time. One is to call the attention of religionists to the crucial meaning of the principle of self-acceptance for health, and to examine Christian doctrine in the light of this principle. A second is in bringing together ideas from two very significant fields which are often considered more conflicting than complementary. Actually, psychotherapy and religion have much to offer each other, and the sooner a deeper understanding is developed the better it will be for the persons to which each ministers.

Without seeming to detract, it should be said that the book is more of the

nature of a survey than a comprehensive discussion. No one book could cover the problem. There are subtle shades of meaning in each of the points of view presented that are not brought out. Problems and procedures are not quite so clear-cut as they are made to seem. It is one thing to give verbal expressions and formulations as is done here; it is another to catch the spirit of the various approaches. It is the latter which really functions in personality and which is so hard to capture in print. It is also significant that the author can give cases in the discussion of the therapeutic approach, but cannot do so in the discussion of the Christian approaches.

One phrase occurs several times which requires comment. The author refers to "theological doctrines which inspire" a particular concept of self-acceptance. It would seem more consonant with a dynamic understanding of personality to refer to theological doctrines as formulations of attitudes toward the self which have been created already in religious experience. We need to understand the emotional and spiritual dynamics behind the three Christian pathways discussed here. It is at the point of experiences which create healthy or unhealthy attitudes toward the self, rather than in intellectual formulations, that religion and psychotherapy will find their ultimate meeting ground.

CARROLL A. WISE

Conscious Clay. By WILLIAM ALLISON SHIMER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. xii, 193 pp. $2.50.

The route taken by this author—"from science via philosophy to religion"—brings him within range of many topics. Opinions are, consequently, set forth regarding nearly every topic which could conceivably come under discussion during the average number of undergraduate "bull-sessions;" it is a guide to such sessions, with a view toward their final end. One can call this end "faith," as defined by Dr. Shimer:

> I behold God's body and am a part of it and . . . my conscious experience is a tiny part of His mind; . . . the universe is a living, creative, divine being in which I exist as an integral part. . . . To *my* mind this is now the most probable explanation. Therefore, since I must go on living or else commit suicide and must in either case have some philosophy of life, the only sensible course for me is to act vigorously according to what seems most likely true. This I call faith.

In this manner, the author seeks, with earnestness and some imagination, to accept both the scientific and naturalistic assumptions as well as the Judeo-Christian view with regard to the nature of man, matter, and the universe. In this restatement of the classical synthesis, he fails at many significant points, and, in fact, loses the richest in both the naturalistic and the biblical heritages.

A plea to the reader is, nevertheless, made. He is called upon to seek God's

plan for this conscious world, and to live according to it—to be constructive and not destructive. The plea is sound enough; the basis on which it is argued is, however, flimsy, whether one views it from either science, philosophy, or religion. The college youth of today, I believe, appreciate the invitation that they live purposively. They seek an understanding of their philosophies of life. They are perplexed at many points and they are wistful. But, I doubt the lasting value of this book in providing some clue to their discovery of integration, meaning, and faith.

J. Edward Dirks

The New Slavery. By Hoffman Nickerson. Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1947. xi, 271 pp.

This work will undoubtedly receive less attention than it deserves. The author as a believing Christian is trying to evaluate modern developments in terms of the Christian faith and practice as it has evolved through the centuries. The average critic for a periodical will consider it as a summary of other books on the Soviet Union, but its real point lies in the religious interpretation of the data which is present throughout. The book should arouse real discussion as to the meaning of a Christian social order.

C. A. M.

Iran Past and Present. By Donald N. Wilber. Princeton University Press, 1948. xi, 234 pp. $3.00.

In a book which wants to present a factual picture of Iran, religion can hardly claim more space than the author has assigned to it. All the main items have been duly mentioned, Zoroastrianism and its development during the Sasanian period, the Shi'a and Sufism, the influence on the religious situation of Reza Shah's revolutionary reform. It would be out of place to take issue with the author on minor points of emphasis and interpretation. To give just one example: it would have been useful to add a few explanatory words about the passion plays which played such an important part in the religious life of the people, instead of the casual statement that they were suppressed.

Introduction to the History of Religions. By Crawford Howard Toy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. xix, 639 pp. $5.00.

This is the fourth impression of a well known work first published in 1913. It is a pity that it has not been revised to take note of the body of opinion created since then, and that the bibliography has not been brought up to date.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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